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ABSTRACT 
The publication of the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 
National Defense Strategy generated renewed focus on great power competition 
(GPC). This research sought to determine if and how irregular warfare could 
shape the current competitive environment by analyzing historical case studies and 
applying lessons from successes and failures to the contemporary era. The research 
determined that irregular warfare can shape the competitive environment in two 
primary ways: by disrupting America’s competitors in the achievement of their 
national objectives, and in strengthening a partner’s capacity for resilience and 
resistance to a great power’s aggression. Additionally, the research uncovered the 
importance of preparing irregular options ahead of a crisis for use in the event of 
escalation to traditional conflict. In light of these forms of irregular warfare and of 
the ever-increasing complexity in the competitive space, it was determined that small, 
agile, and purpose-built teams with broad irregular warfare capabilities should be 
created to execute irregular warfare campaigns, not missions, that consider the overall 
intent, the trajectory of the environment, and the place in the national irregular 
warfare strategy for GPC. Ultimately, this research has determined that the United 
States must embrace competition and the objectives of irregular warfare parallel 
with the goals of GPC; therefore, irregular warfare should be a central component of the 
American GPC strategy. 
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1 
I. IRREGULAR WARFARE IN GREAT POWER 
COMPETITION 
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) identified strategic competition 
between state actors, more commonly known as great power competition (GPC), as the 
nation’s top national security priority.1 However, the bulk of discussion among national 
security and defense experts has since centered around nuclear deterrence, new operational 
concepts and domains, high-end conventional warfare, superior conventional weapons 
technologies, and innovative weapon system development and deployment.2 Although 
many of the ideas, topics and categories mentioned are important, they generally serve to 
deter enemy military action or to destroy the enemy military in the event that action is 
taken. While these are important aspects of the GPC discussion, critical analysis of how 
best to compete and win during the renewed competition phase is largely missing from the 
dialogue.3 
Though no universal definition exists for GPC, nations engaged in it inherently seek 
to improve their global or regional geopolitical position vis-à-vis their primary challengers. 
Therefore, the essence of GPC can be understood with three factors: First, a nation seeks 
to impose cost on a state adversary, without provoking war, to weaken that country’s global 
 
1 Donald Trump, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: 
The White House, December 2017), 2. 
2 Ronald O’Rourke, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implication for Defense-Issues for Congress, 
CRS Report Number R43838 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 7, 2020), 17–18, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf; Heather Graham-Ashley, “CSA Discusses Army’s Growth, 
Modernization, Readiness during 2-Day Visit to Hood,” Fort Hood Sentinel, July 19, 2018, 
http://www.forthoodsentinel.com/news/csa-discusses-army-s-growth-modernization-readiness-during-2-
day-visit-to-hood/article_05c2a64a-8aaa-11e8-a32c-ebb36700efba.html; Paul McLeary, “Flatline: SecDef 
Esper Says DOD Budgets Must Grow 3–5%,” Breaking Defense, February 06, 2020, 
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/flatline-secdef-esper-says-dod-budgets-must-grow-3-5/. 
3 Department of Defense, Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020), 4, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-
1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF; Eric Robinson, “The 
Missing, Irregular Half of Great Power Competition,” Modern War Institute, September 8, 2020, 
https://mwi.usma.edu/the-missing-irregular-half-of-great-power-competition/#:~:text=Secretary
%20of%20Defense%20Mark%20Esper,bases%20in%20the%20Indo%2DPacific; David Vergun, “Great 




or regional standing; second, a state seeks to expand its influence in an effort to increase 
its own global or regional status; and third, nations seek to keep what they have won by 
protecting or defending their collected gains.  
To date, the United States has focused on more overt efforts like deterring 
aggression via conventional military show of force to improve its position globally. 
America’s strong record of conventional military prowess has forced its competitors to 
adopt a strategy more in line with the first two factors of GPC. Russia, China and Iran, the 
latter of which is being included as in this discussion because of its regional stance against 
the United States in the Middle East, have each developed methods of imposing cost on 
the United States or of expanding influence as a means of amplifying their power 
projection. Though each has accomplished this in different ways, those ways have 
generally involved as asymmetric warfare, hybrid warfare, active measures, or unrestricted 
warfare, to name only a few. Essentially, these competitors have developed irregular 
methods of weakening the United States or expanding their own influence. Each of these 
cases will be discussed later in further detail, but it is important to identify their efforts as 
extra-conventional in order to consider appropriate responses. 
If the United States truly seeks to compete and win in the competition phase without 
crossing into the conflict phase, it must consider irregular warfare as its primary vehicle. 
Paralleling the first two strategies of GPC, the essence of irregular warfare is to impose a 
cost using non-standard or unexpected means on an enemy from a minimally exposed 
position to achieve a national or strategic objective. Similar to GPC, irregular warfare can 
also be understood as a non-standard or unexpected effort to expand influence to achieve 
a national or strategic objective. Definitions are important, but when one cuts through 
semantics and analyzes the core of what is trying to be accomplished, a clear parallel 
3 
emerges between GPC and irregular warfare. This paper argues that irregular warfare,4 is 
the capability currently contained within the U.S. military that affords the most effective 
strategy; it provides the most likely path to victory in GPC, helping perpetuate an 
American-led, free and open international order. When viewing the strategic map as arenas 
of GPC, the United States needs to decide where it seeks to impose cost, where it seeks to 
expand influence and where it seeks to defend or retain what it already possesses. In the 
first two arenas, the imposition of cost through indirect confrontation and expansion 
influence, proper application of irregular warfare allows the United States to strengthen 
where it decides to and to weaken its adversaries in other areas. The decision to do nothing 
may also be appropriate when the benefits of either type of action cannot be determined or 
when an adversary’s missteps warrant no further action.  
When irregular warfare is applied, either in its cost imposition or influence 
expansion form, its strategic output when successful should net a national or strategic gain. 
Its collective execution across various theaters should then constitute an irregular warfare 
approach to or strategy for GPC, expanding influence when appropriate, but also forcing 
an adversary to overextend in other circumstances. To defend or retain a stable state-to-
state relationship, deterrence and defense may be enough, although relationships, which 
can be strengthened through irregular activities like foreign internal defense (FID) or 
security force assistance, will likely play important roles as well. The more deftly irregular 
warfare is applied, then the more likely the United States will be at emerging from this bout 
of GPC in a position of strength. 
Though this parallel between GPC and irregular warfare remains theoretical, 
practical applications throughout American history demonstrate the utility of irregular 
 
4 Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare, DOD Directive 3000.07 (Washington, DC: Department 
of Defense, 2017), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_07.pdf. The document essentially defines Irregular 
Warfare as a blanket term describing non-conventional warfare, which may incorporate traditional warfare 
and the use of conventional weapons. According to this directive, Irregular Warfare is “a violent struggle 
among state and non-State actors for legitimacy over the relevant populations.” This document also uses 
the term irregular to “describe a deviation from the traditional form of warfare where actors may use non-
traditional methods such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal activities, and 
insurgency for control of relevant populations.” According to the document, IW also includes “any relevant 
DOD activity and operation such as counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; 
counterinsurgency; and stability operations.”  
4 
warfare as a means to a strategic or national end. Irregular warfare has the potential to 
weaken America’s adversaries in relevant areas, expand American influence in contested 
areas where the United States decides to invest, and protect areas already considered solidly 
inside the U.S. sphere of influence. By committing to a GPC strategy that includes a well-
developed plan irregular warfare, the United States can shape the current era of GPC in 
America’s, and indeed the democratic world’s, favor.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This paper examines two related research questions: How can irregular warfare 
enable the U.S. to influence the competition phase of great power competition? How can 
this approach simultaneously prepare irregular forces and irregular warfare options for 
employment during the anticipated conflict phase?   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
As the United States slowly withdraws from residual military engagements of the 
Global War on Terrorism, it has reengaged with a world of aspiring powers who seek to 
challenge American global influence and dominance. The 2017 NSS identified revisionist 
powers (China and Russia), rogue powers (Iran and North Korea) and transnational threat 
groups as the principal threats to American stability and security.5 To a varying degree, 
each of these groups seeks to “erode American security and prosperity.”6 In response to 
the shift from a nearly complete focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts 
to a greater emphasis on interstate strategic competition, the National Defense Strategy 
(NDS) acknowledged the “increasingly complex global security environment characterized 
by overt challenges to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-
term strategic competition between nations.”7 Both the NSS and the NDS clearly call for 
the nation to refocus on competing globally with emerging or near-peer states. However, 
 
5 Donald Trump, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” 
6 Trump, 2. 
7 Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” 2018, 2. 
5 
the reemphasis on strategic competition has generated different interpretations across the 
defense community.  
Leaders with a more extensive conventional background have identified the need 
for investment in conventional military power because the NSS and NDS essentially 
require the United States military to improve readiness, reestablish deterrent threats, and 
prepare for war with revisionist and rogue powers. Taken solely on its face, competition 
with other great powers certainly increases the potential of a global conventional war, and 
it remains necessary, as it always has been, to prepare for major combat operations against 
capable enemies. In response to the rising concern over Russian and Chinese military 
advances, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command presented an operating concept 
known as Multi-Domain Battle. The principle purpose of the published work is to “identify 
how the Army, working as part of the Joint Force, will operate against these peer 
adversaries to maintain U.S. interests, deter conflict, and, when necessary, prevail in war.”8 
Though it does briefly mention special operations forces as well as the competition phase, 
the U.S. concept primarily addresses how the larger conventional military force will need 
to operate in future wars against an equally advanced force. Clearly, and rightfully, the 
conventional side of the U.S. military is searching for ways to operate in a constrained 
environment after nearly 50 years of operating with supremacy across most domains.  
While the need to fight and win wars is paramount, the emphasis that the NSS and 
NDS place on competition indicates that the United States also needs to actively compete 
now, not simply prepare for war. In order to contend now, the United States also needs to 
assess its adversaries and determine how they are competing. Dr. David Kilcullen’s book, 
The Dragon and the Snakes, seeks to understand the current environment and how near-
peer nations are seeking to compete with the United States. In short, Kilcullen argues that 
American success in conventional war and failure in asymmetric war over the last 30 years 
has taught America’s enemies how to fight against the west. Writing about non-state 
enemies Kilcullen argues that, “our adversaries have adopted a suite of ‘offset strategies’ 
 
8 Department of Defense, Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century, 
2025–2040 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017), 
https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf  
6 
to sidestep our conventional power.”9 Extending his argument, he notes that “while we 
were struggling to deal with the nonstate offset strategies, state adversaries were busy 
developing offset strategies of their own.”10 It follows that America’s enemies, based on 
lessons learned, will not play to America’s strengths. Instead, they will compete 
asymmetrically before war and will likely fight in a similar hybrid fashion during war.  
In response to the actions of America’s enemies, many military leaders, policy 
makers, and defense analysts have argued for a comprehensive response that counters 
adversarial actions during the competition phase. Author of the 2018 NSS Dr. Nadia 
Schadlow, writing for War on the Rocks in 2014, discussed the need to operate between 
“passivity and large-scale intervention.”11 In her article she argues that “the United States 
vacates the space between war and peace. And because [America’s adversaries] cannot 
match American military power directly, it is in this space…that America’s enemies and 
adversaries prefer to operate.”12 In response to the on-going competition in that space, Dr. 
Schadlow advocates for efforts to maintain peace because it “must be actively and 
consistently maintained by engaging in the political competitions that are its constant 
feature.”13  
Writing on the topic of the “Gray Zone,” Generals Joseph Votel and Charlie 
Cleveland identify the need for “organized political warfare” at the national level.14 
Continuing in their argument, they assert that though political warfare employs the full 
spectrum of tools at a nation’s disposal, “SOF are optimized for providing the preeminent 
military contribution to a national political warfare capability because of their inherent 
 
9 David Kilcullen, The Dragons and The Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West, (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), 19. 
10 Kilcullen, 20. 
11 Nadia Schadlow, “Peace and War: The Space Between,” War on the Rocks, August 18, 2014, 
https://warontherocks.com/2014/08/peace-and-war-the-space-between/. 
12 Schadlow. 
13 “Peace and War: The Space Between,” War on the Rocks, August 18, 2014, 
https://warontherocks.com/2014/08/peace-and-war-the-space-between/. 
14 Joseph L. Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” 2016, 102. 
7 
proficiency in low-visibility, small-footprint, and politically sensitive operations.”15 
Without directly identifying the broad category, the authors identify irregular warfare 
conducted by SOF as a critical element to competing in the “Gray Zone.” They conclude 
by asserting that such activities give the United States the best chance to “win” or maintain 
“positional advantage” over America’s principal competitors.16   
Numerous other authors have similarly concluded that irregular or asymmetric 
activities must be undertaken by U.S. SOF to compete with its competitors’ hybrid 
approach to competition and warfare. Frank Hoffman also identified the need to avoid 
“overlooking the unconventional approaches used by our Russian and Chinese 
competitors.”17 In addition, in 2016 Strategic Studies Institute researchers recommended 
that the United States “develop actionable and classified strategic approaches to discrete 
gray zone challenges and challengers.”18 It further asserts that the need to “develop and 
employ new and adaptable concepts, capabilities, and organizational solutions to confront 
U.S. gray zone challenges.”19 Finally, in another study commissioned by the Army War 
College, Michael Mazarr concludes that “Competing successfully in this arena demands 
commitment to steady, coherent, long-term strategies. In some cases, as in responding to 
clandestine proxy wars, it can require operating in the shadows and taking actions that 
cannot be publicly acknowledged.”20  
Despite consistent recognition of the value of irregular warfare, asymmetric 
activities or political warfare, few researchers offer more than general ideas on what 
competition in the gray zone or the current competition phase will entail. This issue is 
generally afforded a few pages in an author or researcher’s concluding remarks, which may 
 
15 Votel et al., 102. 
16 Votel et al., 108. 
17 Frank Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats,” War on the 
Rocks, July 28, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-
hybrid-threats/. 
18 Nathan Freier et al., Outplayed: Regaining the Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2016), 78–79. 
19 Freier et al., 84–86. 
20 Michael J. Mazarr, “Mastering the Grey Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict,” 
December 1, 2015, 158.  
8 
reflect a well-defined characterization of the problem, but does so without dedicated 
thought to specific, effective and strategic solutions. However, as Generals Votel and 
Cleveland identified, while other instruments of national power must be committed, 
irregular warfare employed by SOF present a wide-range of strategic options that can shape 
and influence the current competitive environment, potentially preventing major war with 
near-peers. As a result, this study seeks to fill the current research gap, by identifying 
specific elements of irregular warfare that can be used to influence the current competitive 
environment.  
The second gap, and the central problem with the majority of current scholarship 
regarding  irregular warfare is its focus on actions required in the competition phase; their 
work does not translate to or address the legitimate arguments being made by conventional 
military leaders. As identified above, the stakes of major war between near peers are 
markedly higher than other types of conflict. To that end, this study seeks to bridge both 
research gaps by both exploring the potential for irregular activities to stave off major 
theater war while also preparing for it. This will be accomplished by analyzing the actions 
of America’s adversaries in the competition phase and by exploring America’s past 
experiences with irregular warfare in both competition and conflict. In doing so, this 
research will not only seek to identify specific and wide-ranging options that can be 
executed in the competition phase, but will also prepare irregular forces and irregular 
warfare options for employment during major combat operations.  
The search for answers and options that build and remain relevant across phases of 
GPC is critical because those options can become the cornerstone of strategy. Actions and 
options, isolated by phase, risk being isolated solutions forced by enemy actions. Instead, 
options that span all phases of GPC will allow military leaders to think strategically by 
prioritizing actions in the current phase that could be employed as a supporting effort 
should conflict escalate to open military hostilities. Ultimately, filling these gaps in 
strategic thinking could increase U.S. effectiveness in shaping current and future 
environments. For this reason, it is the focus of this study. 
9 
C. APPROACH  METHODOLOGY 
In order to address these gaps and determine actions that may enable the United 
States to compete in the current environment and also prepare for future conflict, this study 
is organized into the following chapters. Chapter II argues that GPC will characterized by 
irregular conflict; it does this by analyzing and assessing the predominant contemporary 
responses to increased competition with near-peer adversaries, and how the U.S. is 
currently responding. It uses case studies of adversarial actions taken by Russia, China and 
Iran during the Syrian Civil War. Each of these adversaries clearly executed their own 
brand of hybrid, asymmetric or irregular warfare while also appearing to modernize its 
military. In response, the United States has focused its efforts on preparing for high 
intensity conflict, potentially ignoring an advantage it could attain by focusing more on 
irregular warfare in pre-conflict competition. The chapter closes by identifying critical 
elements regarding how and where along the spectrum of conflict America’s principal 
competitors gain an advantage.  
Chapter III looks at how irregular warfare can be used offensively, to impose costs 
and cause wicked problems for adversaries. This chapter presents case studies that examine 
the American experience with various forms of irregular warfare, and notes how irregular 
warfare provided strategic benefits. First, this study will analyze American support to the 
mujahedin in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation from 1979–1989. Though there 
was limited involvement of U.S. military forces, this case allows for an evaluation of 
successful American efforts in proxy warfare. This case also occurred during the 
competition phase, and it therefore provides lessons that can be applied to the current 
competitive environment. This case provides particularly relevant insight into future policy 
in areas where the U.S. does not wish to commit forces, but where it does hope to draw 
adversaries into their own military quagmires. Additionally, this chapter examines how 
U.S. support to the Afghan mujahedin during the Cold War could translate well to the more 
complex problems in places like Syria where the current strategic environment gives the 
U.S. opportunities to counter its adversaries. 
Chapter IV delves into an examination of how one form of irregular warfare, FID, 
can be used in defensive strategies, as a critical tool for strengthening and defending allies 
10 
and partners. The first case study in this chapter looks at the experience of U.S. Army 
Special Forces in Bolivia during Che Guevara’s efforts to create communist insurgencies 
throughout South American in the 1960s. This case will be assessed as an example of how 
strengthening the military capabilities of U.S. partners, through the use of FID, protects 
against potential threats of instability. Though not a state-on-state conflict, this case 
highlights the use of irregular warfare before the conflict phase. A second case study of the 
conduct of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines after 9/11 
will also be analyzed. Like the case study on Bolivia, The U.S. involvement with military 
operations in the Philippines, specifically against the Abu Sayyaf Group and Moro 
Liberation Front provides a case to examine the use irregular warfare, through FID, as a 
means to thwart adversaries in the pre-conflict stage.  
Chapter V focuses on the role of irregular warfare in transitions between 
competition and conflict, arguing that pre-conflict irregular warfare activities not only help 
the U.S. compete, but also help should conflict escalate. This chapter’s first case study 
assesses the development and employment of the Filipino Resistance of Japanese 
occupation during World War II. By studying this case, the utility and impact of a 
resistance and guerrilla activities in a high intensity conflict can be assessed. This case is 
additionally useful because the resistance and guerrilla infrastructure required to 
coordinated and conduct operations were developed during the conflict phase, not before. 
This allows for reasonable speculation that the Filipino resistance movement would have 
been more effective if American military officers were not developing it amid a Japanese 
occupation, in a highly restrictive environment. The enhancement of the French Resistance 
by Jedburgh teams during World War II will also be examined. Similar to the Filipino case, 
the resistance activities in France were developed after the initiation of conflict. This 
example highlights difficulty of creating such networks and infrastructure after the fact. 
Instead, paired with the cases that represent the competition phase discussed above, this 
case may demonstrate the need for preparatory actions in the competition phase.  
In Chapter VI this study will examine the strategic options available to the United 
States during the competition phase. The case studies were chosen to understand how the 
United States has been successful in both the competition and conflict phases in the past. 
11 
The concepts and elements identified in the case studies will be used to generate strategic 
options that can influence the competitive phase and prepare for the conflict phase. These 
options will then be applied to allied nations, competitive spaces and potential quagmire 
states. Using the principles and strategic options, this research seeks to provide national 
and strategic level leaders with the ability to influence the competitive environment while 
shaping potential future high intensity conflict. Such options give the United States the 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
13 
II. GREAT POWER COMPETITION WILL BE 
CHARACTERIZED BY IRREGULAR CONFLICT 
Despite all of the discussion in the national security and defense communities 
regarding the United States’ engagement in interstate strategic competition21 (more readily 
known as GPC), there has been little analysis as to how such a competition will play out. 
Many assume that great powers will fight “great wars,” but recent history suggests 
otherwise.22 It is far more likely that irregular warfare will characterize a significant 
portion of the current era of GPC, given three primary factors: nuclear constraints on 
escalation, new competitive strategies, and the presence of multiple actors in the 
competitive space. 
First, the world remains in the nuclear age, and the constraints that places on violent 
escalation will most likely shape and limit the manner in which states compete for 
influence. Specifically, states will seek to manage their level of violence to prevent 
uncontrollable escalation much in the same manner that the United States and the Soviet 
Union did in the wake of the detonation of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki at 
the conclusion of World War II.23 As a result, during the Cold War, direct conflict between 
the United States and the Soviet Union never occurred; instead, each fought small wars or 
irregular conflicts in pursuit of individual national interests or in an effort to disrupt the 
other power’s achievement of its strategic goals.24 Despite the diminished public discourse 
about nuclear threats, nuclear weapons still exist, and the constraints of the Atomic Age 
 
21 Trump,  “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.”  
22 Naval War College, “Secretary of Defense Esper Tells U.S. Naval War College Students His Focus 
Is Great-Power Competition,” posted August 28, 2019, https://usnwc.edu/News-and-Events/News/
Secretary-of-Defense-Esper-Tells-US-Naval-War-College-Students-His-Focus-is-Great-Power-
Competition. In this discussion at the Naval War College, secretary Esper noted that after America’s recent 
experience in irregular warfare, “times have changed.” 
23 Jeremy Suri, “Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of Global Conflict since 1945,” International 
Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 63, no. 4 (December 2008): 1016, https://doi.org/
10.1177/002070200806300412. 
24 Henry A. Kissinger, “Military Policy and Defense of the ‘Grey Areas,’” Foreign Affairs 33, no. 3 
(1955): 416–28, https://doi.org/10.2307/20031108; Jeremy Suri, “Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of 
Global Conflict since 1945.” 
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have not changed. It is probable that this will continue to shape the global competitive 
space and force the preference of strategies that mitigate the threat of escalation. 
Second, adversaries have acknowledged the United States’ conventional military 
dominance since the Cold War, but they have also watched its struggles in facing irregular 
threats. Since the end of the Cold War, when engaged in a conventional fight, the U.S. has 
won handily. Such dominance, as in the case of the Gulf War in 1990 and the Invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, has shaped the competitive strategies of America’s adversaries.25 Having 
witnessed such proficiency, America’s adversaries are not likely to seek force-on-force 
engagement with the United States militarily. Instead, it is more probable that they will 
continue to maneuver in areas where the United States has been less successful in defeating 
irregular forces. Given this disparity in performance, America’s competitors have already 
developed and engaged using tailored irregular strategies such as hybrid warfare, 
unrestricted warfare, and asymmetric warfare. 
Third, the number of global powers now vying for influence has risen since the 
Cold War, when only two superpowers existed: the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Today, The 
U.S. competes with Russia and China globally, and regionally with Iran in the Middle East. 
Given that the Cold War primarily featured irregular war and low-intensity conflict rather 
than direct confrontation, such activity is likely to increase as more actors wrangle for 
influence and control in their areas of interest. The first two existing conditions, nuclear 
constraints and the development of irregular strategies, have already begun to shape and 
amplify the impact of the now multipolar world. Therefore, due to increasing global 
complexity and the participation of multiple actors currently employing irregular 
strategies, there are strong indications that U.S. responses to GPC will require an irregular 
approach. 
A. ATOMIC AMNESIA? 
The United States and the Soviet Union arose from World War II as dominant 
superpowers, and immediately began competing to extend the influence of their political 
 
25 David Kilcullen, The Dragons and The Snakes, 18. 
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systems, but in the background of relations between East and West was the impact of the 
nuclear age. The United States, having successfully detonated two atomic bombs to end 
the war in the Pacific, triggered a nuclear arms race that changed the way that the United 
States and the Soviet Union competed in the post-World War II era.26 The consequences 
of military escalation between the two Cold War powers grew more severe. With a single 
decision, either power could destroy entire cities and kill millions of people, and a 
reciprocal response would be virtually guaranteed, ensuring devastating costs to both sides. 
This calculus formed the basis of the theory of mutually assured destruction that influenced 
engagement and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War. Instead of open confrontation, each sought to protect aligned countries, exert 
influence on potential partners and weaken states aligned with the enemy.27  
Specifically, the United States, as advanced in National Security Council Report 68 
(NSC-68), adopted a policy of confronting communism wherever it was found or wherever 
it threatened. The report states that, “A rapid and sustained build-up of the political, 
economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program 
intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence 
of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world 
dominated by its will.”28  
The policy essentially advocated for competing with the Soviet Union in any 
manner possible short of war. While this document has been extensively studied and 
analyzed in the post–Cold War years, it unquestionably recognized the threat of the Soviet 
Union and preferred a course that confronted the Soviet Union aggressively yet indirectly, 
rather than through open warfare.29 
 
26 White House, NSC-68 United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (Washington, 
DC, 1950), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm. 
27 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (New York, NY: Taylor & Francis, 1998), 61. 
28 White House, NSC-68 United States Objectives and Programs for National Security. 
29 White House. 
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While the threat of nuclear war no longer frequents national discussion, the United 
States, Russia and China all possess nuclear weapons, while Iran and North Korea, among 
other nations, are actively pursuing them.30 The atomic age not only remains; it has in fact 
expanded to include additional players. Therefore, the consequences of war between major 
powers remain exceedingly high. As such, from a purely pragmatic view, states will likely 
seek alternative competitive means of achieving their national policy goals, by continuing 
to develop irregular methods of challenging adversaries and gaining, extending or 
protecting influence. The consequences of escalation are simply too great for any party to 
pursue war as a desired outcome of competition. However, while the United States has 
recognized the new era of global competition, it has almost solely focused on conventional 
military advancements in preparation.31 This may be a poor strategy, given the influence 
of the atomic age and the ongoing efforts of emerging powers to devise their own unique 
methods of challenging the international order. These actions will likely continue to drive 
great power activity away from high intensity conflict and instead toward low intensity or 
irregular warfare.  
B. AMERICAN TRADITIONAL MILITARY DOMINANCE DRIVES 
ADVERSARIAL IRREGULAR STRATEGY 
In the post–Cold War world of the 1990s, the United States emerged as the 
dominant player on the international stage. Its adeptness on the diplomatic stage 
precipitated its extension of democracy into areas of former Soviet control. Such 
encroachment, intended by the United States to increase the number of democratic nations 
 
30 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation Of American 
Scientists (blog), September 2020. https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/; 
Colum Lynch, “Despite U.S. Sanctions, Iran Expands Its Nuclear Stockpile,” Foreign Policy (blog), posted 
May 08, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/08/iran-advances-nuclear-program-withdrawal-jcpoa/; 
Michelle Nichols, “North Korea Has ‘probably’ Developed Nuclear Devices to Fit Ballistic Missiles, U.N. 
Report Says,” Reuters, August 4, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-sanctions-un-
idUSKCN24Z2PO. 
31 Graham-Ashley, “CSA Discusses Army’s Growth, Modernization, Readiness during 2-Day Visit to 
Hood;” David H. Berger, “Notes on Designing the Marine Corps of the Future,” War on the Rocks, 
December 5, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/notes-on-designing-the-marine-corps-of-the-future/. 
Ryan Evans et al., “How Is the Air Force Adapting to Great Power Competition?,” June 5, 2019, WOTR 
Podcast, podcast, 31:23, https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/wotr-podcast-how-is-the-air-force-adapting-
to-great-power-competition/. 
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and thus reduce the chance of war, threatened Russia significantly. However, the lack of a 
Russian response indicated its incapacitation. The United States capitalized on the 
disappearance of Russian military power and demonstrated its traditional military prowess 
to the rest of the world by quickly and easily defeating Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army 
during the Gulf War in 1991. The future aspiring powers, Russia, China and Iran, noted 
this dominance and resolved to avoid open confrontation with the United States in the 
traditional military sense. While not modifying their strategic aspirations, these nations 
realized the need for revised approaches.  
Although convinced of the futility of conventional confrontation with the United 
States through the 1990s, America’s competitors witnessed U.S. vulnerabilities in the new 
millennium. Despite successful early stages of the war in Afghanistan in 2001–2002 and 
the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, there were significant ensuing struggles due to growing 
and violent insurgencies in both countries. Notably, Russia, China and Iran observed the 
United States falter in the face of a militarily inferior enemy in both Afghanistan and Iraq, 
where the United States failed to score a convincing victory over irregular enemies. The 
inadequacies of the strategic application of U.S. traditional military power contributed to 
important innovations in the competitive strategies on the part of America’s chief 
adversaries. These new strategies included both irregular elements designed to remain 
below an anticipated threshold for an American response and also included the 
development of advanced technology that could challenge American dominance. This 
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technology included nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well as anti-access area 
denial systems and hypersonic missiles.32 
Further analysis of strategic application of U.S. forces in those wars reveals that the 
United States is averse to and misunderstands irregular warfare.33 In Afghanistan, what 
began as an unconventional warfare operation evolved into a large-scale 
counterinsurgency. Oddly, as the enemy adopted for unconventional tactics, the United 
States grew more conventional.34 By defaulting to a cumbersome military package, the 
United States fumbled its early success in Afghanistan, and remains there, still limping to 
a solution. Conversely, in Iraq, the conflict began as a conventional engagement and 
devolved into the insurgency. Yet the United States struggled to define the problem or 
create an adaptive solution for several years before gaining a modicum of control following 
 
32 Robert Martinage, “Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to 
Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability,” 2014, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Offset-
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South China Morning Post, January 19, 2020, 
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threat/china/china-anti-access-area-denial/; Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense, 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-
NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. 
33 Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action, 86–87. In his chapter referencing the Civilian 
Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) in Vietnam, Adams argues that early success of irregular programs tended 
to be negatively influenced later by conventional military leadership.  
34 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan & The Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2006), 14. Rothstein makes the observation that after the fall of the Taliban, when the 
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the Surge of 2006.35 During this era of renewed GPC, such glaring weaknesses by the U.S. 
in the face of irregular threats have influenced it’s adversaries’ preferred approaches and 
have driven the creation and execution of alternate and irregular strategies. In analyzing 
their development, three primary adversaries, Russia, China and Iran who have proven 
adept in implementing their unique irregular strategies, will be analyzed to determine the 
key aspects of their approaches. Finally, Syria, which is a microcosm of the competitive 
landscape will be analyzed to demonstrate the vastly greater complexity present in this era 
of GPC. 
C. RUSSIA: DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF HYBRID 
WARFARE 
The immediate balance of power disparity between American and Russian post–
Cold War power can be seen in both the American effort to consolidate former Soviet states 
into NATO, and the weakening of the Soviet military. At that time, the United States 
capitalized on Russian weakness and exerted its influence to globally export democracy 
and establish the liberal international order. By poaching former Soviet states, the United 
States sought to expand its safety net of democratic nations.36 To the American 
policymaker, adding former Soviet states to NATO enhanced U.S. dominance and security; 
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however, to Russia, it was a strategic threat.37 Notably, the lack of Russian response to 
American aggression throughout the 1990s indicates its defenselessness in the wake of 
Cold War defeat, and its preoccupation with internal matters as the Soviet Union 
transitioned to the Russian Federation. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s military 
also suffered significantly, as its members returned to the now-fragmented states of the 
former Soviet Union, and in the wake, Russia retained a large, but empty, military structure 
with the majority of its billets left unfilled. The corresponding loss of military experience 
and leadership culminated in the ineffectiveness of Russian forces during the First Chechen 
War (1994-1996), which provided further evidence of Russia’s traditional military 
decline.38 
While the Russian military was not in a position to challenge the United States as 
it sought to sort its post–Cold War existence, in subsequent decades, particularly after the 
ascension of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russia endeavored to rebuild its military 
might. Putin did so through by seeking the modernization of its nuclear arsenal and military 
while successfully employing a distinctive form of irregular warfare. Since that time, 
Russia, in recognition of American conventional power, has sought to reassert itself 
through open, but limited, gradual and low-intensity military maneuvers; this brand of 
warfare has been dubbed hybrid warfare.39 Specifically, as the United States strategic focus 
was fixed on extricating itself from wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia took full 
advantage to employ its hybrid warfare strategy by annexing Crimea, occupying the 
Donbas region of the Ukraine in 2014 and intervening in Syria in 2015. During America’s 
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attempted transition from the Middle East, Russia seized an opportunity to challenge the 
post–Cold War order and reemerged as a global competitor. Russian hybrid warfare proved 
effective given the combination of a lack of effective response options to irregular threats 
and an unwillingness to respond with traditional military power. Less overt than a military 
invasion, Russia instead crept into Crimea, executing a fait accompli, employed irregular 
and regular troops to destabilize the Donbas region, and utilized special operations forces, 
military contractors, airpower and Syrian proxies to solidify Bashar Al-Assad’s power. 
Even more broadly, Russia has employed private corporations, cyber activities, 
organized crime organization, and information/influence campaigns to “disrupt the 
cohesion of the West.”40 By reducing the number of conventional military personnel 
needed to conduct operations, the Russians have engaged the United States in a manner 
that falls below direct engagement and exploits the seams of the American national security 
apparatus.41 Though Russian actions have influenced American interests, they have 
remained below the American threshold for a response, and the United States has not had 
public support for a direct, conventional military response to an event of perceived minimal 
importance. Moreover, deterrent nuclear weapons are not a credible threat in response to 
Russian hybrid warfare as Russia has identified a position along the spectrum of conflict 
where it can operate unimpeded as it attempts to regain parity.42 Its timing and methods 
are well-judged, and it has reemerged as a global competitor.43 However, there is also no 
indication nor reason to believe that Russia will settle for reemergence. Rather, Russia will 
likely continue to press its strategic goals, build power, and reject the Western international 
order not by suddenly seeking traditional military engagement, but by using the same 
techniques that have already proven successful.  
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D. CHINA: CHALLENGING THE U.S. THROUGH UNRESTRICTED 
WARFARE 
In a manner similar to the Soviet Union, the Chinese viewed the 1991 Gulf War as 
a stark warning that they were woefully unprepared to battle the technologically advanced 
U.S. military. The antiquated strategies of massing troops, which the Chinese had preferred 
in the past and on which the Iraqis had depended to account for technological weakness, 
had been crushed by the U.S. military. In fact, they concluded that they were vulnerable to 
attack and would lose such an engagement.44 This interpretation of events convinced the 
Chinese that military engagement with the United States should be avoided. In order to 
ensure this, the Chinese began seeking points of intersection with the United States in the 
political and economic sectors. In doing so, China made important progress and emerged 
as a rising power with global influence due to its powerful economic engine.45  
However, amidst this global rise, China also developed alternative military 
concepts and strategies in preparation for potential future conflict, while simultaneously 
advancing its conventional military power. In terms of its traditional military power, China 
has begun an impressive transformation by, among other improvements, building advanced 
aircraft carriers, developing an air force, and creating an Anti-Access/Area Denial system 
of weapons.46 In tandem, its development of alternative military strategies broadened the 
concept of warfare by embracing political warfare, information warfare, psychological 
warfare, and lawfare, the latter of which is defined as the use of legal entanglement to 
advance position and influence.47 
Specifically, having reconfirmed that the U.S. had conventional dominance during 
the initial stages of the 2003 Iraq War, China broadened its concept of military action and 
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competition, seeking to negate U.S. advantages. The concept of Unrestricted Warfare, 
initially introduced by People’s Liberation Army Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, 
sought to broaden Chinese military strategy by combining multiple elements of Chinese 
power with a renewed emphasis on military technology and Anti-Access/Area Denial 
weapons.48 As the authors argue, the United States, because it has led the global order and 
set the parameters of warfare, is actually quite vulnerable because its position forces 
compliance to a certain standard of conduct in order to maintain credibility for the system 
that has bred American power. Because of this, challengers can exploit the weaknesses of 
the system in their effort to supplant the United States. Furthering the point, the authors 
argue that wars should be fought “using all means, including armed force or non-armed 
force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to 
accept one’s interest.”49 This argument for a broader means of conflict coexists with their 
argument that the battlefield should not be finite and that war can occur anywhere.50 
Essentially, the Chinese have developed a strategy to circumvent American strengths of 
conventional military dominance, advanced military technology, and expertise in joint and 
precision warfare by blurring war with other non-violent modes of competition, all while 
building a capable and advanced conventional military.51 
In practice, China challenges the status quo through more subtle actions in 
accordance with the concept of unrestricted warfare.52 In the South China Sea, China has 
sought to extend its territorial waters and the associated Economic Exclusion Zone by 
building runways in the Spratly Islands. Additionally, it has laid claim to virtually the entire 
South China Sea by virtue of an historical map deemed illegitimate by international 
observers. It has also patrolled the area with law enforcement vessels, often harassing U.S. 
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Navy ships passing through international waters, in an effort to reinforce its claim.53 
Finally, China has employed aggressive and predatory economic practices through its 
global investment plan, the “Belt and Road Initiative.” Many have raised concerns that 
Chinese investment will ultimately amount to a “debt trap” meant to cement Chinese 
influence across the globe.54 The uncertainty surrounding Chinese activity provides an 
example of its ability and active efforts to pursue its goals without raising the specter of 
conflict. Given the progress and extension of its influence over the past 20 years, China, 
despite building a powerful military,55 is more likely to pursue its goals in accordance with 
unrestricted warfare so long as that approach proves successful and continues to go 
relatively unchallenged.  
E. IRAN: ASYMMETRIC WARFARE THROUGH PROXIES  
Also observing the Gulf War, Iran, having only three years earlier lost a lengthy 
and brutal war with the same Iraqi military, understood most pointedly the need to avoid 
conflict with the United States.56 The wide disparity in performance against Iraq drove 
Iran toward irregular strategies in pursuit of its strategic goals: regional influence and the 
removal of the United States from the Middle East. To do this, Iran intensified its nuclear 
program while sowing influence through the development of an asymmetric strategy built 
on the cultivation of regional proxies.57 Using those proxies, Iran developed its own 
effective brand of irregular warfare in the Middle East – one of disruptive and 
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unattributable attacks intended to impose a significant enough cost on the United States to 
force it to abandon the region.58 
Iran’s extensive network of proxy forces creates and capitalizes on instability to 
overcome its disadvantage within the traditional elements of national power. Although 
Iran’s nuclear program, conventional military capabilities, domestic politics and cyber 
activities play important roles in Iranian strategy and behavior, its use of irregular warfare 
through the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), especially its foreign and covert 
component, the Quds Force (QF), and its network of proxies and militias, has been the 
primary tool used to impose heavy costs on the United States for its presence in the Middle 
East. Through the Quds Force, which is a highly selective and secretive wing of the 
IRGC.59 Iran has extended its regional reach through its relationships with groups like 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Lebanon, the Badr 
Corps in Iraq, the National Defense Forces in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen.60  
In practice, Iran uses these militias to destabilize unfriendly regimes to facilitate 
conditions more conducive to Iranian influence.61 This directly challenged the United 
States during the American occupation of Iraq from 2003–2011, when Iran’s Quds Force-
sponsored surrogates attacked American interests and sparked violent ethnic conflict to 
increase Iranian-sponsored Shia influence in the Iraqi government.62 Iran effectively 
subverted the American efforts.63 The United States ultimately withdrew all military forces 
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from Iraq by 2011, clearing the path for Iran to establish a proxy government in Baghdad.64 
Until recently, little could be done in Iraq without Iranian permission.65 
Conversely, where it already has a foothold of influence, Iran used the IRGC and 
the Quds Force to work for stability to entrench its institutions.66 This also occurred in Iraq 
following the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, when Iran’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) 
proxies transitioned into officially recognized Iraqi military units, the PMF, executing 
military operations at the orders of Iraq and the behest of Iran.67 Entrenched in the Iraqi 
military, they have been involved in counter-ISIS operations and, in 2016, seized Rutbah 
and the al Waleed border crossing with Syria, simultaneously establishing an, albeit 
contested, contiguous route from Iran to Lebanon.68 Additionally, according to recently 
leaked Iranian intelligence documents, Iran quickly supplanted the United States as the 
arbiter of Iraqi affairs.69 For this reason, during the 2019 protests that led to the resignation 
of Iran-affiliated Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, Iran sought to reinforce his position 
by sending Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani to shore up support for the Iranian-
backed leader.70 When Soleimani’s presence failed to bolster Mahdi’s position and quell 
the protests, Iran violently suppressed them through its proxies.71 
These contrasting illustrations of Iraq’s efforts demonstrate Iran’s effective 
asymmetric strategy of using proxy forces to impose costs on and destabilize unfriendly 
countries and to assert influence upon and stabilize friendly countries. Iran has successfully 
attained outsized influence across the region and likely sees the continued extrication of 
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U.S. forces as further evidence of success.72 Given Iran’s positive perception of its position 
in the Middle East, it is again unlikely that Iran will change course away from this 
successful strategy and instead seek traditional military conflict with the United States.  
F. THE U.S. AND SYRIA 
In no place is the complexity and prevalence of irregular warfare more evident than 
in Syria, where Russia and Iran combined to stabilize the Assad regime and preserve an 
important Middle East ally. Because of Syria’s importance, Iran quickly intervened with 
support across the full spectrum of the elements of national power, but its most significant 
contribution came in the form of military advisors and the provision of paramilitary forces 
to bolster the fractured Syrian Arab Army.73 The Quds Force worked in conjunction with 
transplanted elements of Lebanese Hezbollah to advise, assist and accompany Syrian 
forces.74 As the Assad regime grew more imperiled, Iran further increased its support and 
involvement. Iranian forces, including conventional forces, flooded into Syria to quickly 
steady the Assad Regime.75  
Still, in September of 2015, the conflict was fundamentally transformed when 
Russia began air strikes on Syrian rebel forces, relieving pressure on Iranian-backed militia 
and Syria Army forces. Russian air power and the freedom of maneuver it created for pro-
regime ground forces generated momentum in Assad’s battle against the Syrian opposition. 
With the addition of Russian air power and advisors, the Syrian regime solidified its hold 
on Damascus and gradually expanded its span of control, and in 2016, the regime 
recaptured Aleppo. This proved to be a turning point that allowed pro-regime forces to 
relocate to other areas of Syria. Then, in 2017, a series of de-escalation zones, established 
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with Russian assistance to facilitate a peace process, allowed pro-regime forces to relax 
efforts in southwestern Syria and refocus on capturing other portions of Syria, including 
Eastern Syria, which was controlled by the Islamic State. This move ultimately did 
contribute to the defeat of the Islamic State, as the de-escalation zones permitted the needed 
concentration of forces required to reassert authority over a substantial portion of Syria.76 
Though the importance of Syria to the United States can be debated, what cannot 
be is the complexity of military operations in the country given the actions of Russia, Iran, 
and their proxies. Their activities solidified their hold on strategic interests and 
fundamentally reshaped American policy in Syria, ultimately forcing the United States to 
abandon any form of strategic regime change there.77  
This specific example is a good indicator of how GPC will proceed, with multiple 
nations competing for global and regional influence. Again, successful irregular campaigns 
by adversaries will breed more attempts at achieving national interests and shaping the 
policy of the United States. As complex as the Cold War had been, this new era of GPC 
promises to be exponentially more complicated. 
G. CONCLUSION: MULTIPLE ACTORS EMPLOYING IRREGULAR 
WARFARE IMPLIES THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICA’S 
IRREGULAR CAPABILITIES 
As described above, the performance of the United States in traditional warfare 
using conventional forces has been recognized by other global powers, and despite their 
sustained efforts in modernizing and advancing their own militaries, it is unlikely that 
America’s peer competitors will intentionally enter into or provoke open war with the 
United States. Instead, America’s proven conventional military strength and its troubles in 
irregular conflicts of late has driven its great power adversaries to develop their own 
versions of irregular war (hybrid warfare, unrestricted warfare, and asymmetric warfare). 
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Though distinct, the core of these strategies lies in their attempt to sidestep American 
strength and compete in areas where the United States struggles to find appropriate 
responses. These activities have already begun, and in a multipolar competitive space, they 
are likely to continue until effectively countered.  
Other great powers have also individually recognized opportunities to advance 
using irregular warfare, and as long as such action continues to succeed, there is a high 
probability that it will continue. With every success, the world will grow more complex, 
with actors and their state sponsors increasingly maneuvering to achieve their goals and 
secure their interests around the globe. Given the deftness of the application of these 
irregular strategies, it would be inappropriate for the United States to rely on its 
conventional military prowess to quell these limited actions. First of all, the breadth of 
activity does not permit traditional confrontation in each case. The size and cost of 
conventional military deployments place constraints on when, where and why the military 
is used. Besides, at present, the United States displays an aversion to troop commitments 
of even the smallest scale, so it is unlikely that it would choose to do so in the near future.78 
Second, even if the military did engage a particular enemy, the commitment of forces 
would only provide opportunities for further irregular actions on the periphery of or 
altogether outside of the major theater of war by countries seeking to capitalize on 
America’s mobilized status.  
To conclude, America’s influence, and its attendant liberal international order, are 
being challenged, not through a traditional military build-up, but through unique versions 
of irregular warfare that are shaping the competitive environment. Unlike the Cold War, 
the challenge to American influence has been launched from multiple actors who, 
understanding the nuclear implications of escalation and recognizing the traditional 
military dominance of the United States, prefer alternative techniques to chisel away 
American prestige and reputation internationally. These efforts are achieving notably 
 
78 William Ruger, “Why Americans Want a President Who Ends Endless Wars,” (blog), The National 
Interest (The Center for the National Interest, August 17, 2020), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/
why-americans-want-president-who-ends-endless-wars-167041. Though this tends to remain a political 
issue, the numbers articulated in this poll suggest a desire to curtail troop deployments.  
30 
strategic results, and they are unlikely to cease, even if total war breaks out. Therefore, as 
the United States determines when and where to counter its various competitors it will be 
critical that irregular responses be appropriately considered. How can the United States 
impose costs on its adversaries for their adventurism? How can the United States shore up 
its areas of influence? Although the overall strategy must be broad and all-encompassing, 
an American brand of irregular warfare can play a critical role in the areas where the United 
States chooses to compete.  
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III. ON IMPOSING COSTS: CREATING WICKED PROBLEMS 
THROUGH IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Although the global challenges presented by Russia, China, and Iran, and the 
reemphasis on GPC have raised concerns for the United States, the reemergence of global 
challengers presents opportunities not found in the American-dominated unipolar order. 
Despite developing effective irregular methods of challenging the United States, as 
discussed in Chapter II, the aspiring powers have ambitions that, while driving those 
nations for greater status and achievement on the world stage, are also a great liability. 
Regardless of the ways that those aspiring powers challenge the United States, eventually, 
as is being seen in Syria, those countries will have to commit to their own interests. Though 
irregular in their approaches, that countries have demonstrated a willingness to invest in 
their treasure, military equipment, and the lives of their soldiers should be taken as a signal 
of national interest. It is this commitment that makes the aspiring powers vulnerable, and 
it is this vulnerability where the United States, through irregular warfare, could seek to 
impose costs in areas where it would otherwise be unwilling to dedicate forces.  
At the end of the Cold War, the United States stepped into the role, whether 
intentional or otherwise, of the “world’s policeman,” a term applied to signify that global 
problems needed to be managed by the lone superpower in order to maintain a world 
moderated by the values of the liberal international order.79 While there are examples of 
places where the United States failed to act in this manner, in most others, it did. However, 
with aspiring powers seeking to regain influence, the United States can be more measured 
in its approach. In fact, it has the opportunity, with minimal investment through an irregular 
approach, to impose considerable costs on its great power adversaries. These approaches 
should be reserved for areas where the interests of America’s competitors make them 
vulnerable but where the United States has no interest in gaining, solidifying or expanding 
its own influence. Currently, this approach could apply to areas like Syria, a place where a 
 
79 Wendy McElroy, “How America Became the World’s Policeman,” The Independent Institute, 
posted March 20, 2015, https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=6336; “Must We Be the World’s 
Policeman?,” The New York Times, May 3, 1964. https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/03/archives/must-we-
be-the-worlds-policeman.html. 
32 
litany of problems remains, and the United States has no desire to commit, although its 
adversaries do. By executing a strategy relying on an irregular approach, the United States 
would seek to impose costs by creating a tangled series of problems for the aspiring power 
with the goal of fashioning a disruptive foreign policy quagmire for that adversary. These 
approaches have been tried before and have succeeded in generating wicked problems for 
America’s adversaries that significantly influenced the course of history, for example, in 
Afghanistan under Soviet occupation in the 1980s. Furthermore, to maximize the impact 
of this irregular approach, other elements of the craft must be applied, such as 
psychological warfare, economic warfare, cyber capabilities, information operations, 
subversion, etc. This will aid in effectively producing conditions, or wicked problems, that 
eventually overwhelm America’s adversaries, ultimately contributing to the preservation 
of the free and open international order preferred by the United States and its allies. To 
illustrate the potential for the United States to create wicked problems for its adversaries, 
American covert activities in Afghanistan to support the mujahedin will be analyzed and 
the limited objectives of that operation will be applied to potential operations to disrupt 
Russia and Iran in modern day Syria. These cases combine to demonstrate that, through 
irregular warfare, the American irregular warriors should be used to create problems that 
block or disrupt the its adversaries from achieving their national strategic objectives. 
A. WHAT IS A WICKED PROBLEM AND HOW CAN IRREGULAR 
WARFARE CREATE ONE? 
A wicked problem is a system of interrelated conditions that contribute to a broad 
dilemma. The core problem exists as its own network of conditions, making it difficult to 
define, characterize, and solve. The reason for this is that a solution to one of those 
conditions affects, often negatively, the others in unforeseen or unpredictable ways. 
Therefore, every effort to solve the problem at hand in turn creates additional issues that 
generate consistently negative outcomes. While wicked problems are typically discussed 
in an effort to create a solution, irregular warfare planners, who are seeking to impose costs 
on America’s adversaries, should rather consider how to create wicked problems for 
America’s chief competitors.  
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Wicked problems have plagued America in contemporary history as they have 
largely failed to be solved. The re-emergence of other nations seeking to exercise control 
abroad means that others will now have to confront the problems in their desired spheres 
of influence. It is this condition that irregular warfare can capitalize upon by amplifying 
the difficult conditions in certain countries to produce a set of problems in one place that 
ultimately prevent the advancement of an adversarial global order. In the current great 
power era, irregular warfare can serve to create wicked problems that impose considerable 
costs and present obstacles to the achievement of national goals and interests for U.S. 
adversaries.  
To accomplish this, irregular warfare practitioners can adopt a comprehensive 
approach of costs imposition that creates a more nuanced problem than simply an enemy 
to be fought. Instead, in this form of costs imposition, elements of warfare like deception, 
psychological warfare, information operations, sabotage, and subversion can be layered to 
create a network of problems that hinder success and, as a byproduct of frequent foreign 
policy struggles, create additional issues domestically. America’s irregular warfare experts 
frequently subdivide capabilities, even within the same command or task force, rather than 
applying them in an equal manner. In order to achieve a truly networked and 
comprehensive approach, these capabilities would need to be considered equally. For 
instance, an attack on an aspiring power without an accompanying narrative to shape public 
perception simply creates targets to be attacked. However, if such an attack simultaneously 
were combined with a narrative that produced public animosity, negative economic 
consequences and an international legal challenge, the consequences extend beyond 
borders and creates additional problems. An approach that creates opportunities for the 
cascading of conditions and circumstances in a given nation or region both minimizes 
American exposure and maximizes costs on its adversaries.  
From a broad perspective, the United States did this effectively during the Cold 
War, when it shaped the global perception of communism and used all of its capabilities to 
defeat the Soviet Union. In accordance with the policy of containment, which engendered 
constant competition, the United States applied concepts of irregular warfare in distinct 
ways. In areas where simply imposing costs served the national strategy, an appropriate 
34 
package of practitioners employed all resources at its disposal to hamper Soviet 
expansions, draw the Soviets into disadvantageous competition and manipulate the Soviet 
Union into a vulnerable position.80 
Should this approach then be applied in multiple select locations, a swarming effect 
could be achieved. That is to say, the use of irregular warfare to impose costs and create 
problems in the right locations globally can force America’s adversaries to respond to a 
plethora of difficult issues in many locations. Such an effect would be difficult for even the 
most expert nations to confront and solve. An aspiring power, especially one with a 
floundering economy, like Iran or Russia, or one with minimal patience for issues that drain 
economic power, like China, would likely struggle to respond effectively to such an 
onslaught. Success in effectively harassing adversaries in a handful of locations would 
likely shape the competitive space in the favor of the United States, allowing for the 
preservation of a free and open international order. Having established the theoretical 
concept of creating wicked problems to disrupt adversaries, the following historical 
example of the United States opposing the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s 
demonstrates that this concept has been used before and that it has been effective. 
B. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN 
(1979–1989) 
After Afghanistan adopted a communist regime in the late 1970s, President Jimmy 
Carter signed a presidential directive, on 3 July 1979, to provide non-lethal aid to the 
mujahedin, Afghan “freedom fighters” who opposed the regime of communist leader 
Hafizullah Amin. Later that year, in December of 1979, as Amin’s government appeared 
on the brink of collapse, the Soviet Union invaded and installed its preferred leader, Barbak 
Karmal. In response to the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, President Carter expanded 
and increased aid to the mujahedin to include weapons that would be delivered to the 
mujahedin through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).81  
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As the Soviets grew increasingly bogged down in Afghanistan, they developed an 
effective tactic of helicopter-borne assaults on Afghan mujahedin positions and supply 
lines.82 Having success in this tactic, the Soviets grew to depend on these assault tactics as 
they sought to turn the tide of the war. The Kremlin, sensing the potential for excessive 
toil, pushed for decisive action to quickly win the war amid increasing fears of a stalled 
and floundering foreign action in Afghanistan. According to intelligence reports, the 
leadership in the Soviet Union intended to expand military action in Afghanistan, 
continuing to depend on the use of the helicopter, in an effort to bring Afghanistan under 
control within two years. This clear declaration of Afghanistan as a major Soviet interest 
presented the United States with additional opportunities to impose costs on the Soviets.83 
In 1985, President Ronald Reagan responded to the impending Soviet offensive by 
greatly expanding the covert action program in keeping with his policy of aiding anti-
Soviet resistance movements around the world. The Soviets’ offensive in Afghanistan 
increased their direct involvement there, especially in the use of Soviet helicopters and 
special operations forces like the Spetsnaz. The helicopter assaults on mujahedin positions, 
which had proven effective in the preceding years, were perpetuated in an attempt to bring 
the war rapidly to a conclusion. This intelligence, coupled with Reagan’s promise of 
support to anti-communist movements globally, prompted a greatly expanded covert action 
program aimed at imposing further costs against the Soviets and embroiling them in their 
own foreign quagmire.84   
In this expansion of the covert action program, the costs imposition aspect of 
irregular warfare truly became evident. The expanded authorizations allowed the sharing 
of intelligence, additional training, and the provision of additional weapons and 
ammunition, including weapons with advanced technology. Combined with the 
intelligence produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the mujahedin greatly 
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increased their battlefield effectiveness through the use of plastic explosives for sabotage, 
guerrilla-style raids and ambushes, long-range precision rifles, mortars, and anti-tank 
guided missiles.85 Additionally, and most significantly, the United States authorized the 
distribution of Stinger missiles to the Afghan mujahedin in an effort to combat the 
effectiveness of the Soviet helicopter assaults. No longer able to assault Afghan positions 
with impunity, the Russians began losing aircraft and soldiers rapidly in Afghanistan. 
However, as the Soviets’ situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, they continued to pour in 
money and resources in an attempt to control the problem. The U.S. irregular warfare 
program in Afghanistan would impose significant costs throughout the 1980s until the 
Soviets withdrew in failure in 1989.86 
Although the Stinger missile is widely regarded as the most important aspect of 
U.S. support to the mujahedin in the 1980s,87 the irregular warfare approach in its totality 
was well-conceived, involved minimal U.S. manpower, sought limited goals of “harassing 
the Soviet Union,” and combined the American capabilities of intelligence, technology, 
advisors, diplomacy, and finance into a very small, scalable campaign.88 This approach 
proved successful in imposing costs on the Soviet Union and shaping the global 
competitive space of the Cold War.89 It stands as one version of the irregular warfare 
approach that seeks to impose costs on America’s great power adversaries. Adopting such 
an approach in the right circumstance can shape the new era of GPC, just as it did during 
the Cold War.  
C. OPPORTUNITIES IN SYRIA 
Syria, Russia, and Iran, have signaled their interest in maintaining the status quo 
regime of Bashar al-Assad. The amount of resources and level of effort expended, primarily 
by Russia and Iran, indicates their desire to assert control over important states and regions. 
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Given the residual and deeply problematic conditions that spawned Syria’s now fizzling 
civil war, this presents the United States with an opportunity to impose costs and create 
problems for its adversaries. Because Russia and Iran have stepped forward in Syria, they 
are now responsible for its stability and reconstruction, and have shown through prior 
commitments that a friendly Syria remains in their national interests.90  
The United States, should it choose to engage in GPC in the Syrian theater, has 
ample opportunity for countering Russia, Iran and its network, and China, should the 
Chinese decide to commit resources to the reconstruction effort. The exploration of these 
options is worthwhile because the United States will pursue competition in other arenas 
and these solutions, even if not enacted in Syria, can be applied in a modified fashion 
elsewhere.  
Before laying out the opportunities, it is important to revisit and differentiate the 
versions of GPC that the United States would pursue versus those being executed by Iran 
and Russia. In Syria, Iran and Russia, as shown through their engagement in the Syrian 
Civil War, would each be attempting to expand its influence in Syria in order to improve 
its position in the Middle East. Conversely, as evidenced by troop withdrawals and 
statements by the Trump Administration of an aversion to remaining in Syria. The United 
States would be attempting to impose costs on Iran, and potentially Russia to weaken their 
influence in the Middle East, without escalating to open warfare.91 When possible, the 
United States would be positioning irregular forces that could engage in direct conflict with 
its enemies should escalation to direct conflict occur. Meanwhile, Iran, using its proxy-
centric brand of irregular warfare, is attempting to expand and maintain its influence in 
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Syria, which is one of its national strategic goal. The United States, for its part, would be 
executing the version of irregular warfare that seeks to impose costs on Iran by preventing 
Iranian influence in Syria with minimal exposure. The American strategic goals in this 
instance would be disrupting Iranian support to its proxy network and preventing Iran from 
directly threatening Israel, potentially preventing a broader and more open war in the 
Middle East. Additionally, it would be to harass Russia as it attempts to stabilize Syria, 
maintain a reliable ally, and preserve access to the warm water port in Tartus. With the 
relative versions of GPC and irregular warfare appropriately prescribed, a more thorough 
consideration of America’s options can be considered. 
Should the United States choose competition in Syria, it has the opportunity to stoke 
and support a ready insurgency in various regions of the country and develop a narrative 
of Iranian and Russian support for a ruthless dictator who gasses his own citizens. As 
demonstrated by the fervor of support for Vetted Syrian Opposition, who demonstrated a 
willingness to attack pro-regime forces in southern Syria in 2017,92 the desire for continued 
resistance to Assad’s rule persists in spite of the devastation of the nearly decade-long civil 
war. The brutality of Assad’s campaign to retain power has not been forgotten and certainly 
concerns the Syrian people in areas where Assad regains control. This sentiment has likely 
only been perpetuated by the presence of the IRGC and its Shia militia groups throughout 
the conflict. Even though the IRGC emphasized that the fight in Syria was not against 
Sunnis but for Syria, the Syrian people clearly interpreted the events as an affront to the 
Sunni portion of Syria and an attempted Shia/Alawite consolidation of power.93 
In addition, a February 2020 report by the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, estimates over 800,000 Syrians have been displaced 
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since the beginning of December 2019.94 The still deepening internally displaced persons 
crisis further raises the likelihood of increased insurgent activity as the Syrian government 
and its backers are unlikely to adequately care for and support this population. Despite 
common acceptance that the regime would inevitably regain control of the country and 
retain power, insurgent attacks in the early months of 2020 in Dara’a,95 Damascus96 and 
Rif Damascus against both Russian and Iranian forces shows signs that the insurgency and 
associated instability are likely to continue.97 The limits of pro-regime forces are being 
demonstrated by the slow progress against al-Qaeda associated groups in Idlib.98 Finally, 
the regime continues to struggle to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the majority 
of U.S. troops. In that area, Russian forces and the remnants of the American military 
frequently impede each other’s basic transportation efforts.99 Simultaneously, pro-regime, 
Turkish and Kurdish fighters all struggle for the upper hand, with Turkey showing a 
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willingness to engage Syrian Army elements.100 As these factors demonstrate, the situation 
only grows more complex.  
Clearly, the underlying factors that sparked the Syrian Civil War remain, as well as 
some additional dynamics. Bashar Al-Assad will not suddenly become less tyrannical, and 
the Arab rebels in northwest and southwest Syria remain unlikely to accept him. The Kurds 
and the Turks will remain enemies that threaten security along the northern border. The 
complexity of the situation in Syria has not been simplified, and it will likely take 
considerable Iranian and Russian investment if conditions are to ever stabilize. Considering 
their sluggish domestic economies and already strained international commitments, the 
price of creating a stable Syria may be too steep.101 In short, recent events illuminate that, 
while it is attempting to consolidate control, the Assad regime, along with its Iranian and 
Russian supporters, remains extremely vulnerable to insurgent activity throughout the 
country.  
With these factors present, how should the United States undertake irregular 
warfare in Syria should it choose to compete there? First, it could stoke, prepare and 
support the insurgency. The United States is well-positioned to accomplish this due to its 
presence in the peripheral corners, northeastern and southern, of Syria and its enduring 
relationships with the Vetted Syrian Opposition and its associated factions. Second, the 
United States could push the narrative that Russia and Iran support a brutal dictator who 
has, and will again, use chemical weapons against his own population. This would be a 
simple and true narrative that will stoke the rage of the Syrian people and force the 
international community to grapple with its relationships with Russia and Iran.  
The preparations for such activity could actually begin prior to a complete troop 
withdrawal, while the United States remains overtly in Syria. Without appearing to increase 
its commitment, the United States could prepare the resistance to operate in a latent or 
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incipient phase as it seeks to impose economic costs on Syria, Russia and Iran. Choosing 
a course of action such as this, again only if it chose a policy of competition in Syria, would 
allow the United States to exploit the vulnerabilities of its adversaries: Iran’s exposed 
positions in southern Syria, Russia’s poor attempts at counterinsurgency, and Syria’s thinly 
spread military assets.102 
To achieve this, actions in Syria could be directed to remain below an assessed 
threshold that has been determined to be low enough to avoid triggering escalation. This 
would be aimed at imposing economic and military costs on nations that are experiencing 
domestic economic struggles that threaten their ability to sustain its war effort. Syria’s 
economy has shown signs of near-complete collapse under U.S. sanctions. Iran is in a 
similar situation. Under U.S. sanctions that have inflicted severe damage to the domestic 
economy, Iran may already be showing signs that it needs to retract portions of its 
commitments in Syria.103 Additional pressure of a mobilized insurgency would only add 
to the difficulty of bringing the country under control. Such difficulty could also allow the 
United States, through an overt psychological operation and media campaign, to target the 
fractures that would invariably emerge in the relations between Syria, Russia, and Iran.  
With all of these conditions seemingly in favor of the United States, why not, as 
some have suggested, simply ramp up U.S. military commitments in Syria? The answer 
lies in the type of GPC in which the United States is involved in Syria. First, in the greater 
context, Russia and Iran seek to expand their influence and have committed resources to 
do so as their stake in Syria is larger. This could allow the United States to shape events by 
exploiting the vulnerabilities of their commitment through a proper and precise application 
of irregular warfare. With minimal exposure, the United States, using special operations 
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forces trained in irregular warfare, could impose significant costs on Iran, Russia, and 
Syria. While it unlikely that these countries could recover from a well-coordinated effort, 
even the costs of such an undertaking would serve strategic interests more broadly. 
Additionally, the United States’ most glaring vulnerability with regards to Iran is 
its unspoken constraint against initiating a ground war against Iran. Though the United 
States has taken unprecedented steps, such as the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani, to 
curb Iranian malign activity, these actions fall well short of any strategic indication of a 
willingness to escalate to conventional war. This constraint, while reasonable, also 
emboldens Iran, as well as Russia. Therefore, introduction of additional overt U.S. forces 
in Syria would only enhance the vulnerability of large troop deployments in the Middle 
East. Much as has occurred in Iraq, Iran would view the troops as legitimate targets and 
may choose to stage attacks on them. This would eliminate the advantage that the United 
States currently holds in the GPC and irregular warfare arenas throughout the region.   
If the United States chooses to engage in GPC in Syria, a recognition of the stakes 
and commitments of each side should aid in the selection of a strategy. Given Iran and 
Russia’s commitment to expanding their influence in the Middle East, the United States 
needs only impose adequate costs and expose the weaknesses of its adversaries to achieve 
its strategic goal of weakening Iran and Russia in the region. Should the United States 
choose a policy of competition, proper application of irregular warfare could present it with 
additional strategic opportunities and responsibilities to capitalize on the failure of the 
Iranian and Russian venture in Syria.  
By capitalizing on the instability and competing interests in Syria, the United States 
can turn the tables on the aspiring powers by harassing them incessantly there. This can be 
accomplished by combining American capabilities of irregular warfare and psychological 
warfare with the already in-place resistance to the Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad. The 
goals of such an irregular warfare approach do not need to include regime change. The 
goals can be more limited and manageable, as they were in the initial stages of the covert 
action in Afghanistan. Harassing the Russians and Iranians and forcing the expenditure of 
their treasure would be a worthy goal of American irregular warfare in Syria. Harassment 
of those countries has the potential to disrupt the advancement of the Russian or Iranian 
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agendas during this era of competition. Drawing additional resources and investment from 
either adversary could shape the overall competitive environment and allow the United 
States to preserve the overall status quo international order that has benefitted it and other 
democratic nations since the end of the Cold War.  
Despite the potential benefits of supporting resistance movements, many would 
argue that these activities in places like Syria can threaten global perceptions of the United 
States. Certainly, there is inherent risk involved. However, adequate selection of the 
locations for this form of irregular warfare can mitigate those risks. Choosing to execute 
this type of irregular warfare in locations where resistance activities and instability already 
exist against a government leader whom the world perceives as corrupt, ineffective, 
tyrannical or illegitimate will minimize the risk to the American reputation. For example, 
in Syria, the United States could make the case that it is supporting the resistance to Assad’s 
regime, which has used chemical weapons against his own people, bombed internally 
displaced persons camps, and will undoubtedly order reprisals in territory that the Syrian 
Arab Army regains. In doing so, the United States could also, through effective information 
operations, associated Assad’s Russian and Iranian backers, making American support for 
the already active resistance much more palatable in the international community. 
D. CONCLUSION – IRREGULAR WARFARE CAN IMPOSE COSTS ON 
AMERICA’S GREAT POWER ADVERSARIES 
Irregular warfare has been used to effectively impose costs and disrupt America’s 
competitors in the attainment of their national goals. In the renewed era of GPC, an 
irregular approach of this sort can be effective given the proper circumstances. To be truly 
effective, the team executing the strategy in each location should be tailored to that 
particular environment so that problems can be layered using a full range of irregular 
capabilities (guerrilla warfare, sabotage, subversion, cyber, psychological warfare, 
economic warfare, etc.) to maximize the impact and create a breadth of issues to ensnare 
America’s enemies. While such an approach may be successful in individual cases, to truly 
shape the global competitive environment, irregular capabilities can be applied in multiple 
locations in a swarming and loosely networked manner. This singular aspect of irregular 
warfare would serve to distract America’s competitors and drain them of resources, 
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political will, and public and international support. The United States, however, utilizing 
irregular warfare of a different type could strengthen partnerships considered vital to 
maintaining the liberal international order that has bred success for democratic nations over 
the past 20 years. 
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IV. TO STRENGTHEN AND DEFEND PARTNERS: IRREGULAR 
WARFARE TO PREVENT INSURGENCY, SUBVERSION AND 
FOREIGN ENCROACHMENT 
While adopting a strategy of imposing costs where America’s chief competitors are 
vulnerable can create negative and disruptive effects, other aspects of irregular warfare 
seek to create positive and stabilizing effects in America’s sphere of influence. This has 
been accomplished in various ways throughout the country’s history, but its predominant 
vehicle, from an irregular warfare perspective, has been through security partnerships and 
FID. FID is an element of irregular warfare that uses American advisors to train and 
organize security forces of a partner or ally against potentially destabilizing actors or 
forces. Such an effort, from the American perspective, prevents the deterioration of the 
status quo international order and creates additional proficient forces to combat instability, 
whether created by subversive state or non-state actors. By strategically utilizing this 
advisory role, the United States can employ irregular warfare as a non-standard means to 
expand or solidify its influence in pursuit of the national policy of preserving a free and 
open international order, especially when that order is threatened by encroaching Great or 
aspiring powers.104 
Applied further, relationships in areas vulnerable to adversarial influence, such as 
Ukraine, Georgia, or the Philippines, allow the United States to harden resiliency and help 
prepare the host nation for a potential invasion  from a state seeking to reverse the status 
quo. By executing FID missions, not only does the United States aid in the preparation of 
defense forces, but it can also prepare to support a future combined effort against an 
occupying or attacking force. Such a relationship, already being established ahead of a 
crisis, would prove critical during the important moments in the aftermath of an adversarial 
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maneuver, similar to the Russia fait accompli in Crimea. Options and strategies for 
thwarting the attack will have been preestablished, allowing them to be enacted quickly. 
Finally, by pursuing and maintaining these relationships, the United States, clearly signals 
its interest and intent to potential enemies. The investment of forces in an advisory role 
indicates that the United States and its partners would be resilient against subversive 
actions and would resist an invasion or occupation with their full measure. In other words, 
investment in a country or region by the United States makes it clear to the enemy that 
military action there would not be assured success, and the potential for intense conflict 
would have to be weighed.105   
Though it is difficult to find examples of the United States employing irregular 
warfare to thwart another state actor’s subversive or hostile activities in an allied country, 
lessons and principles can be drawn from two U.S. counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 
efforts. First, in 1967, the United States employed this form of irregular warfare to train 
and employ Bolivian Rangers, who were pursuing Che Guevara as he attempted to build a 
communist insurgency to foment revolution in South America. Second, in the Philippines 
after 9/11, the United States utilized an irregular approach in a largely successful 
counterterrorism effort against the Abu Sayyaf Group on the island of Basilan. Both cases 
of American irregular warfare, though not specifically directed against forces sponsored 
by state actors, demonstrate successful examples of the United States enabling the defeat 
of irregular forces within the borders of an ally through small teams with broad capabilities. 
A similar approach can be adopted in the struggle to protect important American allies who 
are threatened by the resurgence of other great powers. 
A. U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES IN BOLIVIA (1967) 
In 1967, at the height of the Cold War, the United States, at the request of Bolivian 
President René Barrientos, sent an Army Special Forces Team to Bolivia to help solidify 
the country’s defense in the face of a growing communist threat.106 Although the presence 
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of communist revolutionary leader Che Guevara was unknown at the outset, it was clear 
that communist elements were organizing and taking action against the newly elected 
democratic government.107 However, the threat was, in fact, being organized by Guevara, 
whose whereabouts were unknown after his failure to incite revolutionary change in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.108 Now, Guevara intended to spark a communist 
insurgency in Bolivia that he hoped would threaten multiple Latin American countries and 
eventually draw the United States into a large, messy war resembling the then-ongoing 
conflict in Vietnam.109 Even before it learned of Guevara’s presence in Bolivia, the United 
States deployed a select Army Special Forces Team to maintain the stability of the 
democratic government and prevent communist subversive elements from threatening the 
government.  
Guevara’s resistance movement in Bolivia began in 1966, when Bolivia, off the 
heels of a coup d’état in 1964, democratically elected President René Barrientos. Guevara, 
viewing Bolivia’s checkered history, identified the conditions there as favorable to his 
revolutionary ideals.110 Based on previous experience and on reporting from sources in 
Bolivia, he believed the newly installed Barrientos presidency to be facing massive dissent 
among the populace.111 Additionally, Guevara judged the Bolivian military to be poorly 
organized and susceptible to an insurgency.112 Because of this perceived political 
instability, Guevara chose Bolivia to be the place of his next revolutionary movement.  
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To best capitalize on the country’s instability, Guevara sought to establish his 
insurgency in the dense forest along Bolivia’s border with Brazil.113 He transplanted 
experienced Cuban revolutionaries to serve as a cadre and initially relied on the associated 
military support in Bolivia. Once established, Guevara intended to build base camps and 
establish logistical capabilities to support his future insurgent operations.114 Next, Guevara 
would train guerrillas who had been recruited from the countryside and, when prepared, 
would execute guerrilla-style “hit and run” tactics against softer, rural targets.115 Success 
in those attacks, Guevara surmised, would generate support for the guerrilla organization 
and increase its membership. Once of adequate size and capability, the guerrilla groups 
would then execute additional attacks intended to force a withdrawal of the military back 
into the cities. Finally, having succeeded in supplanting the military, Guevara would direct 
attacks against major cities in Bolivia.116 
By creating a rampant insurgency in the heart of South America, Guevara expected 
that the United States would intervene, first with a minimal investment of troops, then with 
the introduction of conventional forces.117 Such a move, he posited, would enable his 
guerrillas to embroil the United States in a difficult insurgency, which, as Vietnam was still 
ongoing, would stretch its resources and contribute to its defeat.118 His vision was noted 
ten years earlier in his diary, when he wrote of bringing revolution to South America: “I 
will set myself up in the selva at the frontier between Bolivia and Brazil…From there it is 
possible to put pressure on three or four countries.”119 Guevara intended to take advantage 
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of the difficult terrain along the borders of these two countries to grow an insurgency 
capable of influencing the entire region. As a leading proponent for communist insurgency 
in Latin and South America during the 1960s, Guevara represented a clear threat to 
American foreign policy in the region.120 Guevara was depending on this threat to 
American foreign policy to achieve his goal of creating an additional quagmire in South 
America. 
However, having received reports of insurgent activity in the rural eastern portion 
of his country, President Barrientos requested military assistance from the United States. 
The United States agreed and specifically organized and deployed a U.S. Army Special 
Forces Team for the mission. It is important to note that the United States sent this team 
before any significant insurgent movement had begun; when the Special Forces Team 
arrived, there was not a widespread insurgency to deal with, only the beginning of a 
revolutionary effort. This made the situation more manageable and allowed adequate time 
for effective training. 
Though Guevara’s presence was originally unknown, the deployment of the team 
is indicative of the wider global upheaval that threatened U.S.-led democracy.121 
According to its commander, Major Ralph W. Shelton, the team’s initial mission was to 
train a Bolivian Ranger Battalion because the country was being threatened from the 
frontier by communists.122 To accomplish their mission, the Special Forces Team executed 
a textbook FID mission. Upon arriving at their selected training site in the remote Bolivian 
town of La Esperanza, the team assessed that the Bolivian Rangers needed training that 
began at the basic level before progressing to the requisite advanced collective tasks.123 
As such, the Special Forces Team created a program of instruction that spanned four 
phases, with training beginning with the basic individual level and ending with advanced 
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collective tasks that would be required in future counterinsurgency operations.124 Training 
also culminated with a field training exercise in conditions that mimicked the unit’s future 
real-world counterinsurgency operations.125 
Once employed in combat, the Bolivian Rangers proved effective; their 
counterinsurgency operations began only 12 days after completing the course.126 Those 
operations ultimately resulted in the relatively quick capture of Guevara and the disruption 
of his communist revolutionary movement in Bolivia. Having joined the ongoing search 
for Guevara and his revolutionaries in September 1967, the Rangers quickly and effectively 
established a cordon of the area where Guevara was believed to be. On 8 October 1967, 
the Rangers received a report from a local farmer who observed Guevara’s element moving 
along the edge of his field. Reacting quickly, the Rangers isolated the area, trapping 
Guevara and his men in a canyon.127 After several failed attempts to break the cordon, 
Guevara was ultimately captured in a final attempt to escape the snare of the Rangers.128 
The tactical proficiency displayed by the Bolivian Ranger Battalion reflects on the training 
provided by the Special Forces Team, and the strategic impact, that the elimination of a 
subversive element and global revolutionary had on the nation of Bolivia. 
In addition to expert training and engagement with local forces, key to the mission’s 
success was the Special Forces Team’s utilization of other capabilities inherent to irregular 
warfare, such as civil affairs, to establish rapport and gather intelligence on communist 
activity in the countryside. To better ingratiate itself with the local population, the Special 
Forces Team supported the local economy by frequenting local businesses rather than 
relying on their own logistical infrastructure for resources. The majority of the team’s basic 
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life support items were purchased through off of the local economy. Additionally, the team 
frequently ate and socialized with locals at nearby restaurants. This effort effectively 
established rapport with the local populace and provided ample evidence that the 
Americans were friends rather than foes.129 In an environment where an adversarial idea 
or movement may be under way, support of the populace is significant and can help counter 
the pull of the threatening ideology before it has actually begun.  
In addition to supporting the local economy, Special Forces medics taught 
sanitation and provided medical services to the locals.130 Civil affairs operations were 
intentionally expanded as the medics were also sent to nearby towns to provide medical 
treatments, further enhancing public sentiment and in creating additional sources of 
information.131 Additionally, the medics worked with local Peace Corps volunteers in 
providing aid to local villagers. The bulk of the issues they addressed resulted from poor 
hygiene and contaminated water. In sum, the medics treated over 2,500 Bolivian civilians 
and used $10,000 of medicine and supplies. The payoff was a largely supportive population 
that would frequently provide information to the Americans.  
Finally, the Special Forces Team was instrumental in completing the construction 
of a school in cooperation with United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID).132 The locals presented the team with their concerns over the lack of progress 
on a project to build a school and requested help. Over the course of several months, Major 
Shelton pressured the USAID representatives to provide the funding and supplies to 
complete the project. Though progress on the project remained slow, it was ultimately 
completed in December of 1967.133 While these efforts in medical care and civil affairs 
operation did not directly contribute to the tactical success of eliminating the communist 
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revolutionaries in Bolivia, they did set favorable conditions and built positive civilian 
sentiment that contributed to operational success.134  
After the team’s success in training the Bolivian Rangers and in supporting the local 
population, the Bolivian government continued its relationship with the U.S. Army Special 
Forces by enlisting their assistance in training nine additional infantry companies and 
advising one airborne battalion in small unit tactics and counterinsurgency operations. This 
continued relationship, essentially between the Bolivian and American governments, is a 
positive and tangible effect of successful irregular warfare missions. Though Che 
Guevara’s legacy likely outshines his true impact, there was little doubt that his existence 
and his operations presented a threat to democratic nations and to the United States, by way 
of its allies. American foreign policy interests were protected, and American irregular 
warfare strategy increasing the Bolivian’s military’s tactical ability and state stability in 
Bolivia simultaneously.  
Though not specifically countering a peer-state actor, the success of the mission 
remains an example of how irregular warfare can be used to strengthen capabilities of 
American partners and can prevent the sprawling influence of adversarial irregular forces. 
While this case presents numerous tactical lessons about the conduct of FID, the strategic 
impact matters most in terms of relevance to GPC. While the immediacy of these results, 
the Bolivian Rangers captured Guevara within one month of completing their training with 
U.S. Special Forces, cannot be guaranteed, the mission indicates the broader ability of this 
form of irregular warfare in hardening allies against potential threats to stability. Similarly, 
to the Bolivian experience, a more modern example of FID can be seen in the Philippines.  
B. THE PHILIPPINES: OEF-P AND AMERICA’S COUNTERTERRORISM 
EFFORTS 
During the early stages of the Global War on Terrorism, as U.S. counterterrorism 
and counterinsurgency efforts greatly expanded in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, 
counterterrorism operations in the Philippines remained small and irregular, despite the 
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fact that counterterrorism cooperation in the Philippines predated the 9/11 attacks.135 
Known as a potential hotbed, several prominent terrorist organizations, the Abu Sayyaf 
Group and the Moro Liberation Front are based in the Philippines, while others take 
advantage of the availability of safe havens in the country. Many of the groups have ties to 
al-Qaeda, which used them to expand its reach and promote the perception of a global 
terrorist network.136 Though the counterterrorism effort in the Philippines gained renewed 
emphasis following the 9/11 attacks, they were never truly able to expand due to American 
political concerns and the reluctance of the Filipino government to allow broad and overt 
U.S. support. This combination manifested into a series of restrictions that ultimately 
forced the United States to adopt an irregular approach to combatting terrorism in the 
Philippines.  
As a result, the United States Pacific Command leaned heavily on its Theater 
Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command – Pacific, to develop a plan 
to enable the Filipino counterterrorism effort. Given the extent of operations elsewhere at 
the time, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, the Philippines remained an “economy of 
force theater.”137 Correspondingly, Special Operations Command – Pacific approved a 
plan to build the Filipino Armed Forces’ ability to defend against insurgency and terrorism 
and maintain national stability.138 In addition, both the government of the Philippines and 
U.S. forces agreed to execute humanitarian and civic action projects to improve the lives 
of the disaffected population and to endear government support in the population.139 They 
also agreed to employ information operations and psychological warfare to highlight their 
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activities against terrorism and in support of the population.140 This approach utilized 
multiple aspects of irregular warfare and combined multiple capabilities that were uniquely 
tailored to achieve the stated goals.  
The thrust of the effort against terrorism in the Philippines was centered on 
establishing a semblance of security in Basilan, the region where the Abu Sayyaf Group 
flourished. These efforts came from U.S. Army Special Forces, who initially focused on 
training Filipino forces in combat skills. The training produced more effective Filipino 
units, and subsequently, security forces increased their patrolling operations in Basilan. 
The uptick in counterterrorist patrols gradually allowed Filipino forces to regain control at 
local levels, and established the security required to leverage other capabilities in the effort 
against Abu Sayyaf and other terrorist organizations.141  
With footholds of security at local levels, civic action, humanitarian assistance and 
information operations were employed to expand security and generate stability in the 
region. The United States supported the Filipino government’s efforts to restore essential 
services and provide basic life support.142 The projects also served to stimulate local 
economies, as labor and materials were frequently sourced locally. As the projects 
succeeded, appropriate messages further consolidated the support of the local populace, 
increasing support for the Filipino government and armed forces. Although Abu Sayyaf 
was not destroyed, the group’s sanctuary was severely restricted and the Basilan region 
had the potential for peace and stability.143  
While a certain degree of success was achieved in the irregular warfare effort in the 
Philippines, missteps also occurred. The level of restrictions that were imposed on U.S. 
Special Forces Teams on accompanying the partner force and on the employment of certain 
capabilities and tactics, must be identified. Without the resolution of these missteps, use of 
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U.S. irregular warfare in the future would prove detrimental to its ability to effectively 
strengthen its partners and allies and prevent influence by other great power competitors. 
The concept of employing small teams with a wide array of capabilities comes with the 
need to allow those experts a wider berth to operate to accomplish the mission. This 
certainly does not mean that operators can act as they please, but rather, that severe 
restrictions that limit American activities should be avoided, as they tend to also limit 
effectiveness. Instead, operations such as the battle against the Abu Sayyaf Group should 
have support from both the U.S. and host nation governments and clear but wide limits on 
American activities should be applied.144 
Still, the American experience in the Philippines represents successful application 
of American irregular warfare. Though the Abu Sayyaf Group has not been eradicated, its 
impact and reach were significantly curtailed. In this case, the historical instability in the 
Philippines and the prevalence of destabilizing forces made the effort more extensive in 
energy and duration than was required in Bolivia. This distinction suggests that the earlier 
the United States can get involved in thwarting subversion, the simpler the effort may be. 
Waiting until an issue arises may prove detrimental in that the problem may have taken 
root and will then require extensive effort to uproot. However, the Philippines remains as 
an example of a small number of American forces that succeeded in using a wide range of 
capabilities to counter an irregular enemy within the borders of an ally.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Through the analysis of the cases presented against communist insurgency in 
Bolivia and against terrorism in the Philippines, it is clear that American counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism efforts effectively used irregular warfare to degrade and disrupt 
irregular threats within the borders of allies. Specifically, several important factors emerge. 
First, the United States can and has employed irregular warfare to support and stabilize 
allies that are facing an irregular challenge. It is important to note that in both cases, these 
efforts occurred at the behest of and with the permission and participation of the host 
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nation. This, therefore, represents the more overt side of American irregular warfare. 
Certainly, operational security must be maintained, but American irregular forces will not 
always be operating in the same clandestine manner as would be expected when supporting 
resistance forces as discussed in Chapter 3. In fact, the clear policy and commitment to 
cooperation between the United States and the host nation greatly bolstered the efforts.145 
Such cooperation will remain important in countering the various irregular threats posed 
during this renewed era of GPC.  
Second, the counterinsurgent and counterterrorism elements deployed by the 
United States in these case studies leveraged a wide range of capabilities to counter their 
specific threats. In each situation, the special operations force was tailored to meet the 
unique characteristics of the enemy and the environment. While those capabilities 
remained relatively basic, utilizing operational training, civil affairs, and psychological 
operations, it is the concept of creating teams uniquely tailored for the problem that must 
endure. America’s competitors employ a diverse range of capabilities in their efforts to 
upend the status quo, and small, networked units of American forces should be permitted 
to deploy with a plethora of capabilities to meet those challenges in multiple locations. 
Depending on the situation, the requisite capabilities will likely be expanded and may 
include nonstandard military packages to account for the numerous axes along which 
adversaries are seeking to compete. These different capability packages, which will likely 
be needed at the small unit level, will be required to achieve the desired comprehensive 
effects. The combination of multiple capabilities is emblematic of the irregular approach 
and should be considered as a critical aspect of the American approach. The creation of 
tailored units capable of applying multiple capabilities to unique situations is an important 
characteristic of American irregular warfare and should be considered as the United States 
seeks to apply it to the current competitive environment.  
Furthermore, future subversion, insurgency or other irregular threats will not 
necessarily look like Che Guevara’s band of guerrillas or the Abu Sayyaf Group, and 
therefore, other capabilities may need to be utilized. In fact, the selection of these case 
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studies does not imply that counterterrorism or counterinsurgency principles hold true 
across the board in GPC, but they do demonstrate the ability of small, tailored teams to 
improve host nation capability and preserve the strategic value of key partner and allies. 
Therefore, nodes of comprehensive irregular warfare capabilities that are small, agile, and 
comprehensive in their ability to counter foreign subversion and adventurism will be 
critical to strengthening America’s allies and protecting its well-established international 
order.  
Finally, using irregular warfare in this way to combat other great power aggression 
can help to eliminate subversive forces and make the allied host country more stable. By 
improving security forces in threatened or developing nations, the United States, through 
its important network of allies, can harden itself against irregular or asymmetric threats 
during GPC. Such an approach should be considered in any case where the United States 
has clear interests that directly conflict with its adversaries. As competitors venture into 
that space, the United States must have a ready option to prevent instability and close the 
door to actors seeking to revise the international order in their favor. With Russian efforts 
to expand its borders, and Chinese designs on multiplying its influence, an irregular warfare 
strategy, uniquely applied, has the ability to maintain stability in exposed American allies. 
Such efforts should be aimed at preventing subversive or adversarial elements or ideas 
from taking root, and in maintaining stability and resiliency in the face of an encroaching 
enemy; they can also prevent or diminish the effectiveness of competitors in cultivating 
influence and change in areas where the United States has a national interest in retaining 
an allied relationship. 
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V. PREPARE FOR ESCALATION: THE UTILITY OF 
IRREGULAR FORCE IN TRADITIONAL CONFLICT 
Despite the benefits offered through a networked and comprehensive irregular 
warfare campaign, proponents of investment in conventional military modernization argue 
that America’s chief competitors have chosen to employ their own irregular strategies 
ultimately as a preparatory measure for full-scale conflict. These more discreet operational 
activities are meant to dissuade U.S. involvement, allowing for continuous but measured 
progress while they build their conventional forces to a level of parity with the United 
States. In fact, this argument is true: as Chapter II notes, adversarial irregular strategies, 
are multifaceted. America’s competitors are employing their brand of irregular warfare in 
lieu of leverage provided by traditional military balance. While the Russians focus on 
hybrid warfare, they are also modernizing their nuclear arsenal and making significant 
technological advancements within their military.146 The Chinese, amidst their progress 
through more subtle means outlined in Unrestricted Warfare, have outpaced the United 
States in terms of military size.147 Their development of air, land, and naval power is, in 
conjunction with their development of Anti-Access/Area Denial systems, clearly in 
preparation for a military engagement with the United States.148 And Iran, while seeking 
influence in the Middle East through its asymmetric strategy built on regional proxies, and 
to make up for its lagging military in comparison with the United States, has continued its 
effort to build a nuclear program and sought to more closely align itself with Russia and 
China.149  
While the preferred irregular strategies of these countries are shaping the 
environment and buying time for their militaries catch up, this does not justify the exclusion 
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of irregular warfare as a key component of U.S. strategy as it relates to GPC. First, inaction 
against adversarial irregular strategies ignores the strategic effects being attained in that 
realm. Second, and importantly, this argument also ignores the utility that irregular warfare 
has played and that conventional forces have needed it to play in even the most traditional 
of military conflicts. Evidence of such utility can be found in the cases of the American-
led Filipino Resistance in North Luzon and the experience of the Jedburgh teams in France, 
both during the Second World War.  
Although World War II is frequently regarded as one of the great traditional 
conflicts in history, it featured a considerable amount of irregular warfare. Allied 
commanders sought to tap into resistance forces in order to gain an advantage by directing 
them in operations that supported the broader allied mission. However, effective 
communication systems and logistical networks were not pre-established, making 
coordination of operations difficult in hostile environments. Intuitively, establishing them 
after an area became denied proved difficult and often produced inconsistent results. Still, 
the mere fact that Generals such as Douglass MacArthur and Dwight Eisenhower actively 
sought to capitalize on existing resistance networks in the Philippines and in France, 
respectively, indicates that irregular warfare even benefitted the overwhelmingly 
traditional military power of the Allies before and during the conflict. Though many 
lessons, both positive and negative, can be gleaned from their efforts, each offers an 
indication of how irregular forces can support traditional forces in war. 
A. THE U.S. ARMED FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES: NORTH LUZON 
AND THE FILIPINO RESISTANCE 
When U.S. forces withdrew from the Philippine Islands in 1942 at the outset of 
World War II, a small number of Americans remained behind. These Americans were 
authorized by their respective commands to develop and employ a Filipino resistance 
network against the Japanese occupiers.150 After a long effort to organize and reestablish 
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communication with their commanders, these guerrilla forces eventually provided 
information for allied forces in advance of their landing in the Philippines and supported 
offensive operations after the fact.151 These irregular forces stand as an example that, 
despite all the assets at the disposal of America’s conventional forces, irregular forces can 
still be quite valuable, especially in a fight where relative parity exists between the two 
sides. However, given their struggle to organize under Japanese occupation and 
communicate with allied commanders, they also provide a warning that, if irregular forces 
might be needed, it is better to build them in a more permissive environment, rather than 
in a denied area after a crisis when they are needed most.  
Despite being established in a hostile environment, the United States Armed Forces 
in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP-NL) exemplified the utility of a resistance 
network and demonstrated numerous ways that an irregular force can be an asset to a 
traditional one. While the USAFIP-NL sought to execute effective disruptive attacks in the 
years before the American landings on Luzon, they also provided value to the Allies as 
they planned their landing and future offensive operations in the Philippines. It is this 
mindset, one of execution of the present mission while simultaneously planning for 
possible future roles in conjunction with conventional forces, that truly captures how the 
irregular approach can be scaled from extremely limited involvement to full-scale 
conventional intervention. The utility in adopting a networked and scalable irregular 
approach to competition is in its ability to influence the competitive environment and the 
conflict phase simultaneously. With ready irregular forces, the United States, should 
conflict occur, can call upon those forces to support future operations without needing to 
generate them after the fact, as has been done more often than not in the past.  
In the case of the Philippines, ten hours after the bombing at Pearl Harbor, the 
Japanese began their invasion of the islands. In a campaign that culminated in March 1942 
with the withdrawal of American forces, including General MacArthur, out of the need to 
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preserve combat power and reconsolidate resources for the war in the Pacific.152 However, 
across the Philippines, pockets of Americans refused to surrender to the Japanese, and often 
with approval and encouragement from their commanders, they escaped capture and joined 
the already active Filipino resistance.153 On the whole, the Filipino resistance succeeded 
in preventing Japanese control across the majority of the country. One such successful 
operation was led by Colonel Russell Volckmann, who escaped on the eve of surrender in 
April of 1942 and journeyed from Bataan to join a resistance organization in North Luzon. 
Volckmann, who had served as the Executive Officer for the Filipino 11th Infantry 
Regiment would, eventually become the commander of the USAFIP-NL.154 While there 
are numerous tactical-level lessons about the organization of a resistance movement and 
execution of guerrilla warfare, the most relevant element of USAFIP-NL’s success for this 
study is the degree to which they impacted future allied operations. The USAFIP-NL 
succeeded in setting favorable conditions in advance of the allied landing, providing 
accurate intelligence to follow on allied forces, in seizing critical objectives in support of 
future operations in the Philippines, and in operating alongside conventional forces in 
combined operations.155 
By coordinating disruptive guerrilla operations, the USAFIP-NL greatly increased 
the likelihood of a successful and unchallenged landing in the Lingayen Gulf in January 
1945. In advance of the allied landings Volckmann directed an effective guerrilla campaign 
characterized by sabotage, subversion, raids, and intelligence gathering designed to “erode 
Japanese combat power before the Americans arrived to retake North Luzon.”156 The 
USAFIP-NL operations, which targeted the Japanese logistical system and transportation 
infrastructure, effectively distracted the attention of the Japanese forces from defending the 
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perimeter of the island while also degrading the readiness and capability of the defending 
force. This gradual erosion of readiness and focus on the defense  prompted the Japanese 
to withdraw their forces to the interior of the island to prepare a defense in the mountainous 
terrain.157 While this impact would later require difficult operations in the mountainous 
terrain to defeat Japanese forces in North Luzon, it set favorable conditions for a successful 
allied landing and subsequent build-up of combat power and logistical capability.158 
To gather accurate and valuable intelligence, Volckmann created a network of 
supportive local Filipinos, and by utilizing this auxiliary network, the USAFIP-NL 
provided strategic intelligence that informed critical aspects of Southwest Pacific Allied 
Command’s (SWPA) planned invasion. Volckmann, having only reestablished 
communications with SWPA and MacArthur’s headquarters in September of 1944, 
provided a recommended landing site based on observed Japanese movements throughout 
the latter half of the year.159 Because the Japanese withdrew the majority of their forces 
from the perimeter of North Luzon and established entrenched defensive positions in the 
mountains, Volckmann sent SWPA a message recommending Lingayen Gulf for the 
landing site, as it would be relatively undefended.160 On 9 January 1945, Volckmann 
received word that the Allies had landed in the vicinity of Lingayen and faced relatively 
little resistance.161 In this case, intelligence operations organized and coordinated by the 
USAFIP-NL over the course of 1944 contributed to the formation and execution of the 
larger plan. 
Because the allied landings also occurred amid ongoing Japanese efforts to relocate 
their forces to the interior, resistance forces in South Luzon, in an effort to provide time 
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and space for the landings, executed a series of coordinated and effective operations to 
disrupt Japanese efforts to relocate forces and establish effective defensive lines.162 In 
MacArthur’s own words “ roads were torn up, bridges destroyed, mountain passes blocked, 
and rail and motor facilities sabotaged at every turn to interfere seriously with Japanese 
troop and supply movements.”163 Though he does not expressly indicate this in his reports, 
the operations conducted by the guerrillas at a time of extreme vulnerability for the landing 
force, would likely have allowed the Allies to maintain the momentum of their offensive 
operations in Luzon. The allied forces landing at Luzon were able to consolidate their force 
and build combat power while the guerillas maintained pressure on the Japanese forces.164 
This ability by irregular forces to disrupt the enemy at a time of extreme vulnerability for 
conventional forces provides yet another clear example of the benefit that irregular forces 
can provide to the main effort in traditional warfare.  
After the Allies landed in Lingayen Gulf, the USAFIP-NL was reassigned to the 
Sixth Army and turned their operational attention to offensive operations designed to defeat 
Japanese forces that were now entrenched in the mountains. Such operations lasted from 
January until August of 1945 and required the decentralized efforts of all of Volkmann’s 
district to achieve strategic results. Because of the collective knowledge within his ranks 
of the location of enemy positions, Volckmann made arrangements and established 
rudimentary communication procedures with the 308th Bomb Wing for his guerrillas to 
direct aircraft in the bombing of Japanese defenses in the mountains.165 Later, these 
elementary techniques developed further as Volckmann outfitted his guerrillas with two-
way radios to talk directly with the pilots overhead.166 The coordination between the air 
and ground elements allowed for much more effective assaults on enemy positions. Among 
the first efforts at forward air control, these efforts proved an effective means of softening 
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Japanese defenses as the USAFIP-NL guerrillas moved to execute their final assaults. 
These methods, created between guerrillas and the Army Air Force pilots, also contributed 
to the future of air-to-ground coordination, and provide another example of the 
effectiveness of combining American technological and traditional military advantage with 
irregular forces operating with an intimate knowledge of the area.167 
Notably, the offensive to reestablish allied control of North Luzon consisted of a 
coordinated effort between conventional and irregular forces, with guerrillas executing 
strategically vital operations in support. The U.S. I Corps began offensive operations from 
the south, which allowed the USAFIP-NL operational freedom to attack fortified Japanese 
positions in the Lepanko-Mankayan region, an area of great strategic importance to the 
Japanese because of its rich resources, concentration of Japanese arms and ammunition 
reserves, and position along the primary avenue of approach to Ifugao, where the Japanese 
had intended to make a last stand if necessary. With the I Corps offensive dividing the 
attention of the Japanese forces, the USAFIP-NL executed operations that more closely 
resembled combined arms maneuver than the commonly held perception of guerrilla 
operations. In conjunction with artillery fires and the demolition of critical bridges, 
Volckmann’s guerrilla forces attacked the Japanese in the region and quickly seized the 
initiative. Although the Japanese fended off numerous attacks, the USAFIP-NL culminated 
their offensive with coordinated air strikes, a mortar barrage and subsequent assault on the 
remaining Japanese positions. Ultimately, the guerrillas seized the objective on 20 July 
1945 thereby eliminating one of the most fortified Japanese positions and controlling a 
considerable supply of their weapons and ammunition.168 
In another area of North Luzon, Volckmann identified an opportunity to both deal 
a severe blow to Japanese air power and secure a critical strategic asset for allied use in 
future operations: the airfield at Ilocos-Tangadan. Volckmann directed one element of the 
USAFIP-NL to seize the airfield in February of 1945. By 9 February 1945, only one month 
after the allied landings at Lingayen Gulf, the guerrillas secured an airfield behind enemy 
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lines. Accomplishing this provided the Allies with an air strip to support future bombing 
of the Japanese throughout the Pacific and greatly improved the logistical efficiency in 
resupplying the Sixth Army and the USAFIP-NL.169 
Further exemplifying the capability of a well-trained and organized irregular force, 
a separate element of the USAFIP-NL succeeded in ridding the primarily defensive 
Japanese forces of their best mobility asset, the tank. As the American I Corps attacked 
from the south, the Japanese, in an effort to relocate their heaviest weapons to aid in the 
defense, mobilized their armor to reinforce the southern defensive lines. However, 
elements of USAFIP-NL had concentrated their efforts along the major high-speed avenue 
of approach most likely to be used by armored assets, and, using anti-armor weapons, 
destroyed the Japanese armored column, eliminating a critical enemy asset.170  
The ability of USAFIP-NL to integrate with conventional forces and the larger 
campaign plan remained evident throughout the duration of the conflict.171 Based on the 
example of the USAFIP-NL, it is clear that irregular forces can provide tremendous benefit 
to more traditional forces, even those powered by large, modern and capable armies, navies 
and air forces. First, as evident from USAFIP-NL’s activities ahead of the allied landing in 
Lingayen Gulf, irregular forces can disrupt the enemy to such great effect as to allow a 
larger invading force the time and space to do so relatively uncontested. Additionally, the 
pressure of such action can potentially be sustained until such time that the landing force 
has consolidated and is prepared to commence its offensive operations. Second, irregular 
forces can provide accurate intelligence combined with a local knowledge of routes, terrain 
and local population that has the potential to reduce friction in a combat environment. This 
was seen in Volckmann’s ability to recommend an adequate landing site where the Allies 
would face relatively little resistance. Additionally, the USAFIP-NL continuously 
provided information that allowed allied aircraft to more accurately target Japanese forces 
in prepared defensive positions in North Luzon. Third, as the fight shifts toward traditional 
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warfare, irregular forces can be used in conjunction with conventional forces to great effect. 
The USAFIP-NL provided numerous examples of successful operations where U.S. Army 
conventional units participated in support of or supported by guerrillas. The benefits 
provided by the Filipino guerrilla forces in retaking North Luzon are but one example and 
justification for the United States to commit to a more comprehensive and networked 
irregular approach to GPC. 
In no way do Volckmann and the USAFIP-NL’s achievements in North Luzon 
mean that irregular forces will always be successful. Several factors must be understood so 
that appropriate conditions can be set to increase the effectiveness of the irregular 
approach. First, the United States Army had been present in the Philippines in advance of 
the Japanese invasion. Many of the men who remained in the Philippines had worked with 
Filipino military forces in the past. Second, though Volckmann is critical of the Filipino 
conventional forces at the beginning of his memoir, the training and military collaboration 
with American partners cannot be discounted. This should encourage the United States to 
engage with local forces and populations in important areas during the renewed era of GPC. 
Third, no communication method had been preestablished, and it took years for the 
USAFIP-NL to regain communication with SWPA. Contingency means of 
communication, especially now in the era of vastly superior communications technology, 
must be considered when irregular forces are adopted. Such consideration will increase the 
relevance and value of irregular forces.  
B. THE JEDBURGHS AND THE FRENCH RESISTANCE — IRREGULAR 
WARFARE IN FRANCE 
General Eisenhower, in need of a way to harness the potential of the French 
Resistance, sent small teams of American, British and French soldiers, dubbed the 
Jedburgh teams, into France ahead of the allied invasion of Normandy. His planned use of 
resistance forces and guerrilla warfare in conjunction with a large conventional campaign 
further indicates historical recognition of conventional forces’ utility for an irregular 
supporting effort. However, the manner that the Jedburgh teams were employed also 
provides evidence that irregular forces need time and effective means of communication 
to be most effectual. In the French case, despite being designed for use from the outset of 
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the Normandy invasion, flaws in the employment of those forces provide critical lessons 
for their future efficacy in operating with conventional forces.  
The allied employment of the Jedburgh teams, three to four men inserted into 
France to organize the resistance and conduct guerrilla warfare against the German 
occupiers, yields several important distinctions from the USAFIP-NL. First, Eisenhower 
recognized the potential benefit offered by the French Resistance and included their 
activities in the larger plan for the invasion of France. Second, despite this positive 
recognition of the capability of irregular warfare in the planning stages, the Jedburgh teams, 
for primarily political reasons, were not infiltrated into France until 5 June 1944, only one 
night prior to the landings at Normandy.172 The short time frame presented many of the 
teams with problems too complex to be overcome. In the end, the experience of the 
Jedburgh teams in France offers one positive aspect, the inclusion of irregular forces in a 
largely traditional military operation, but one negative aspect, the failure to insert such 
teams early enough to train, organize and direct forces toward the strategic mission.  
In the planning phase for the Normandy invasion, Eisenhower, the Supreme allied 
Commander, recognized the presence and potential of the French Resistance. With 
estimates placing the number of resistance forces near 100,000, Eisenhower sought to 
employ the Maquis, French guerrilla fighters, to disrupt German movement and logistics 
behind their forward line of troops. In order to accomplish this, the Allies included the 
Jedburgh teams as part of the invasion plan to link up with resistance forces and direct a 
guerrilla warfare campaign in support of the main allied invasion.173 The plan essentially 
sought to use allied soldiers as liaisons to the already existing French Resistance forces; 
their task was to execute guerrilla operations with the Maquis that would support other 
ongoing allied operations.174  
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Eisenhower’s identification of the potential of irregular warfare to aid the invasion 
underscores the notion that irregular warfare can support traditional warfare and that these 
two forms of warfare are not mutually exclusive. Instead, commitments to employing an 
array of modalities can contribute to the overall success of the operation. If a commander 
facing the monumental task of invading Normandy can recognize the utility of irregular 
forces, then it should be equally considered in the modern era of GPC. However, simply 
because Eisenhower wanted to utilize the Jedburghs to maximize the potential impact of 
the French Resistance does not mean that this endeavor proved entirely fruitful. While 
some teams enjoyed success, others failed to accomplish meaningful support of allied 
objectives.  
The critical component necessary for achieving strategic results was the amount of 
time allotted the Jedburghs on the ground with the Resistance. Though not necessarily the 
fault of Eisenhower, as political considerations delayed the infiltration of the Jedburghs, 
the decision not to insert the teams until the night prior to D-Day minimized the influence 
that the allied advisory teams could have on the direction of resistance operations. In cases 
where the Jedburghs joined with well-organized and prepared elements of the Maquis, 
tactical operations succeeded and proved relevant to the strategic objectives of the invasion. 
However, where the Resistance was not fully developed nor harbored an ulterior political 
motive for its operations, the Jedburghs generally failed to marry their operations to the 
larger allied strategic picture.175 
For example, in Brittany, where the French Resistance was fairly unified, the 
Jedburgh teams were much more effective. However, the reason for this success had less 
to do with the skill of the Jedburgh teams than with the existing unity and organization of 
the resistance in those particular areas. The more significant teams were inserted into areas 
where less competition among resistance groups existed, making it easier for the adoption 
of the allied mission. Because of this, the Maquis only needed the Jedburghs to act as 
liaisons, providing objectives that synchronized with the larger allied plan. So, in those 
 
175 Benjamin F. Jones, Eisenhower’s Guerrillas: The Jedburghs, The Maquis & The Liberation of 
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cases, the French Resistance was less dependent on the Jedburgh teams for organization 
and training of guerrilla forces, needing only actionable targets to remain relevant to the 
allied invasion.176 
Conversely, in and around the Normandy region of France, meeting Eisenhower’s 
intent of disrupting German reinforcement and resupply capabilities proved difficult. The 
most prominent reason for this was the fractured nature of the local bands of Maquis. Three 
Jedburgh teams, with call signs “Hugh,” “Hamish,” and “Ian,” were inserted into complex 
situations where competing political interests among the various Resistance groups 
threatened any operational success. The Jedburghs, facing a poorly unified, yet ready and 
willing, general population, needed to try to unify the Resistance to maximize their impact. 
For the teams, problems created by the lack of a cohesive resistance delayed their expected 
execution of their tactical mission. Instead of focusing on training and equipping the forces 
or on planning operations, the Jedburgh teams spent valuable time mitigating differences 
between the competing resistance groups in an effort to unify them.177 
In addition, even with the fragmentation issue, the unexpectedly large numbers of 
Maquis could not be accommodated with training and weapons due to the limited time for 
this to be supplied. This exacerbated the political sensitivities and highlighted the lack of 
time to appropriately develop the Resistance in France. Those teams that succeeded, 
generally did so because the resistance was more united and well-developed in their areas 
of operation. Those teams who struggled were neutered in preference for a hopeful attempt 
to plug tactical liaisons into ready-made resistance networks. Unfortunately, those 
networks were not without flaws and drawbacks that affected the overall usefulness of the 
Jedburgh teams to the wider campaign.178   
These vignettes of contrasting experiences among Jedburgh teams further 
demonstrate the larger point about the need to allow adequate time for American advisors 
to organize and train their partisan forces and to direct them in operations that support the 
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larger traditional military campaign. Time should be allowed for adequate assessment of 
local forces by competent professionals with sound knowledge of irregular warfare. Such 
professionals can identify gaps in the organization, rifts between various elements, and 
they can either influence certain parties to embrace the common goal or recommend against 
partnering with those particular forces. Time is required for this: time for assessment, time 
for training, and time to develop necessary operating procedures, tactics and techniques. 
Therefore, the earlier that American irregular operators can engage with local forces, the 
better.  
Even in relatively positive writing about the Jedburghs, such as LTC. (ret.) Will 
Irwin’s The Jedburghs, quite a few of the teams are not discussed, likely due to their 
ineffectiveness. In his book, Irwin conveys the success stories of several Jedburgh 
teams.179 His accounts are thorough and well researched; however, he does not endeavor 
to imagine, as the exercise would be somewhat counter-historical, how the impact of the 
Jedburghs could have been improved. First, they could have been inserted into France well 
in advance of the Normandy invasion. Such additional time would have permitted adequate 
organization and training of resistance forces. Additionally, the appropriate number of 
weapons and ammunition could have been delivered via airdrop, maximizing the impact 
of guerrilla warfare in areas where the population aided the Jedburghs. Additional time 
may have also improved the effective use of guerrilla forces in direct support of 
conventional forces, as was the case with the USAFIP-NL. Second, the Jedburgh teams 
could have been better linked via more effective communication. Instead, except in cases 
where Jedburghs were close to each other, they were linked to higher headquarters via radio 
communication. This invariably stunted the ability of various pockets of resistance, except 
those in close proximity, from communicating information and coordinating operations 
across the theater. Such communication and coordination could have enabled the swarming 
of German logistical operations and disrupted German operations far more effectively. 
Such an assessment of the untapped potential is captured in the Epilogue of Irwin’s book 
as he quotes a British member of the Jedburghs, Sir James R.H. Hutchinson, who would 
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later serve as the British Under-Secretary of State for War: “Jedburgh teams were more 
than justified. The pity is that more were not sent sooner as was requested. The maquis 
wanted them and asked for them…allied officers were recognized immediately as having 
and offering views unbiased by French internal questions; they could have no axe to grind. 
The Jedburgh conception was truly founded. It was, alas, not used to the full.180     
C. CONCLUSION  
Irregular forces can and have provided key benefits to traditional forces at the 
commencement of hostilities. Therefore, the choice in GPC does not need to be between 
investment in irregular approaches and conventional military power. Rather, investment in 
irregular warfare can feed into the eventual plan for the introduction of conventional forces. 
It would be wasteful to build relationships with local forces to employ a resistance 
movement during the competition phase only to reverse course and abandon the irregular 
approach altogether in preference for the traditional military activities during open conflict.  
Therefore, in keeping with the need for a networked approach to GPC, irregular 
warfare leaders must plan for escalation from the beginning of American involvement. 
While seemingly planning for irregular warfare to fail, it is actually this preparation that 
makes irregular warfare efforts in the competition phase transferrable to conventional 
forces in the event of war. Planning for escalation of this sort should be done from the 
beginning, concurrent with any other type of irregular warfare. Such efforts prepare 
resistance forces for future employment in support of conventional forces.  
During that planning, adequate preparations should be made continuously to 
provide viable options for future indigenous support for conventional operations. As 
Volckmann did in a denied area, these preparations should include the development of an 
intelligence network, communication systems, contact procedures, infiltration routes, safe 
areas, logistical networks, etc. Anything that could be called upon to support future 
operations by indigenous or irregular forces or the U.S. military should be considered 
throughout the campaign. With these considerations, America’s irregular approach to GPC 
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becomes useful if planning for escalation in traditional conflict fails. Even if the irregular 
approach fails to adequately shape the competition phase or prevent open war, the 
necessary groundwork that supports the combat environment will have been laid.  
By doing this, a comprehensive, networked irregular approach achieves the 
characteristic of scalability and modularity. What may begin with a handful of troops 
practicing the irregular approach could grow to a larger effort to train and employ irregular 
forces. That effort could grow more still into a conventional operation with irregular forces 
supporting the wider war effort. This is how irregular warfare remains relevant for 
conventional military operations. Even though the larger fear that the United States’ 
conventional military will not maintain its edge, must be addressed, irregular warfare can 
aid in tipping the balance in future conflicts. 
In sum, the contrasting cases of the use of irregular warfare to support traditional 
warfare offer insight into best practices for the integration of irregular and conventional 
forces. First, American advisors of irregular forces should plan for escalation from the 
outset of the campaign so that they are immediately relevant in the war effort. In the case 
of the USAFIP-NL, this did not occur, and leaders like Volckmann spent many months 
developing reliable resistance networks under Japanese occupation. Second, engagement 
of irregular forces prior to conflict can allow adequate networks to form. If this engagement 
before a conflict does not occur, it is equally important for traditional commanders to 
exercise patience as the irregular network is validated in a denied environment. As 
evidenced in the Jedburgh case, a late infiltration can cause teams to depend more on the 
existing resistance organization rather than on the skills of the advisor. As such, this 
strategy relied on luck for success rather than on the ability of advisors in organizing for 
and executing guerrilla warfare. Third, while working with irregular forces, effective 
communication should be established between the irregular and traditional forces so that 
appropriate actions can be synchronized between both elements. In Volckmann’s case, the 
establishment of communication took two years. His organization would likely have been 
better served with consistent and reliable communication with SWPA. Fourth, American 
irregular advisors and their forces should plan and recommend the best ways for their 
integration into conventional operations. This allows the irregular forces to convey their 
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strengths to conventional forces and, as in the case of USAFIP-NL, for the development of 
combined operations that capitalize on each other’s strengths. All told, an irregular 
approach that considers and prepares for the possibility of escalation to traditional conflict 
serves the United States during the competition phase and contributes to success in the 




With the publication of the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy, the United States has declared a renewed focus on GPC. In response, 
each armed service branch has sought to prepare for major power war, under the 
assumption that competition breeds war. However, an effort to prepare for advanced large-
scale military engagement solely focused on preparing for conventional combat, rather than 
competition, constitutes an incomplete strategy. Though the notion of competition conjures 
visions of a major war between superpowers, the emphasis placed on competition in the 
NSS and NDS requires the United States generate a complete concept of how it intends to 
compete. American efforts to bolster U.S. conventional forces or large-scale military 
concepts, while necessary in the event of war, do little to affect the current competitive 
environment. These new approaches to competition are slowly shaping the overall 
environment because America’s adversaries have developed irregular strategies to 
successfully circumvent American traditional military power.  
Though it clearly cannot represent the full thrust of American strategy during GPC, 
American irregular warfare can shape this current era in critical ways, most notably by 
imposing costs on America’s competitors in areas important to them, and by strengthening 
allies and partners by preparing forces that are resilient and resistant in the face of external 
threats. In fact, on a smaller scale, the goals of irregular warfare parallel the goals of GPC. 
In the latter, nations seek to improve their geopolitical position by weakening opponents 
by imposing costs without sparking escalation and by expanding their influence to enhance 
their own status. In parallel, though more localized, irregular warfare seeks to impose cost 
through non-standard means without exposing the nation to the potential of traditional 
conflict, or by expanding influence in pursuit of an individual national or strategic 
objective. Stated simply, individual irregular operations around the world can aggregate to 
form the collective irregular strategy for competition between great powers. Irregular 
warfare, applied selectively and appropriately, can help the United States maintain the 
international order that has allowed free nations to thrive. There are three primary ways 
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where irregular warfare can influence GPC: disrupting its adversaries’ pursuits, expanding 
its sphere of influence and in preparing irregular options in the event of traditional conflict. 
First, irregular warfare can shape the competitive space by disrupting the efforts of 
America’s adversaries through the intentional generation of difficult problems for its 
competitors in areas where they have signaled national interest or commitment. These 
efforts could range from supporting resistance activities, as illustrated by U.S. support to 
the mujahedin in Afghanistan in the 1980s, to information operations, influence operations, 
or cyber operations designed to foment an untenable public sentiment in a particular 
country. A potential modern application can be found in Syria, where Russia and Iran have 
both invested heavily, signaling their interest in the survival of the Assad regime. Given 
the United States’ unwillingness to commit to a long-term investment and the fragile and 
fractured population, Syria is a place where U.S. irregular warfare could be used to impose 
costs on an adversary as it attempts to stabilize its ally. Actions in Syria, as was the case in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s, could be designed in such a way to limit American direct 
involvement while also draining Russia and Iran of financial and military resources. This 
model could be tailored to appropriately fit other situations globally in a coordinated, but 
decentralized effort, to overwhelm America’s competitors in their attempts to roll back the 
status quo. 
Second, the use of irregular warfare can help the United States expand its sphere of 
influence by strengthening and solidifying partners and allies that are under threat from 
America’s great power adversaries. To accomplish this, the United States can utilize the 
framework and model of FID which, among other successes, eliminated the communist 
insurgency in Bolivia in 1967 and significantly reduced the reach of Abu Sayyaf Group in 
the post-9/11 Philippines. However, instead of focusing on internal threats, this type of 
irregular warfare would be designed to build “resilience and resistance” within a nation’s 
borders. The intent of these efforts would be to harden a partner nation’s population to 
external subversive efforts designed to weaken the state and separate it from Western 
influence. Additionally, in areas where the external threat is deemed particularly high, the 
United States can begin openly developing resistance forces to dissuade that action if 
possible, and to resist occupation if necessary. In either case, the United States grows its 
77 
sphere of influence, signals its interest through overt investment in allies and partners, and 
creates difficult challenges for other great powers by preparing resistance to their 
subversive or offensive actions.  
Third, while executing the two aforementioned versions of irregular warfare, the 
potential for traditional conflict should be actively recognized; planning for this potentiality 
will make irregular warfare relevant to the traditional military services and will avoid the 
mediocrity found during WWII. In light of this, the small units conducting these operations 
should develop plans and contingencies for the use of their partnered irregular or 
professional forces to support future conventional operations. In the case of WWII, in both 
France and the Philippines, irregular forces were generated after the fact to support the 
needs of the Allied powers. In France, Jedburgh teams achieved varying degrees of success, 
but they were inserted too late to truly affect the structure and effectiveness of their 
resistance organizations. As a result, their success depended upon the degree of 
development and already established effectiveness within their partnered organizations. 
Developing these forces ahead of time, instead of creating them during a crisis in a non-
permissive environment, will make them more easily employed and avoid excessive risk. 
By contrast, Russell Volckmann did succeed in creating guerrilla forces in North Luzon, 
Philippines during World War II, but it took him years in the non-permissive environment 
of Japanese occupation. Still, his organization succeeded both in disrupting Japanese forces 
prior to the introduction of American conventional forces, and in operating in conjunction 
with those conventional forces to defeat the Japanese in North Luzon. While the case of 
the Jedburghs demonstrate the need for planning ahead of the need for irregular forces, the 
case of the USAFIP-NL demonstrates that irregular forces can effectively support 
conventional operations, before and after their introduction to the theater. Even during 
these initial phases of GPC, all planning for irregular operations should consider a 
trajectory that includes escalation to war. 
As evidenced through historical cases, American irregular warfare has shown itself 
capable of shaping permissive, semi-permissive and non-permissive environments in 
positive ways. In the non-permissive environment of Afghanistan in the 1980s, the United 
States supported resistance activities in an effort to disrupt Soviet activity there. In the end, 
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the Afghan mujahedin, supported by the United States, expelled the Soviet superpower in 
1989 and imposed significant economic, political and reputational costs that contributed to 
the eventual downfall of the U.S.S.R. Through its military and paramilitary organizations 
which are well-versed in irregular warfare, the United States can achieve similar results in 
appropriately selected environments. In fact, the U.S. Army Special Forces and the CIA’s 
paramilitary forces were developed during the Cold War for exactly this purpose. However, 
instead of being asked to solve difficult problems like terrorism and insurgency, they would 
be asked to create difficult problems that would stifle the progress of America’s 
adversaries. Without getting into detailed planning, this may include sponsoring and 
directly supporting resistance activities, as occurred in Afghanistan, creating negative 
perceptions through information warfare, and disrupting partnerships by shedding light on 
predatory lending practices. Candidate locations for this type of activity range from Syria, 
where relationships with resistance organizations endure, to Africa, where instability 
dominates and other great powers appear ready to invest. How these forces can be used, 
and the problems that they can create in specific areas in order to shape the overall 
competitive space, is only limited by creativity. 
In more permissive environments like Bolivia in 1967 and the post-9/11 
Philippines, the United States developed security forces that successfully thwarted 
irregular threats from a communist insurgency in Bolivia and terrorism in the Philippines, 
leading to better internal stability. Irregular warfare can be used to develop similar concepts 
and programs aimed at countering great power subversive or irregular activities within the 
borders of an American partner or ally. An appetite for such activity has already been 
signaled in the Baltics and in Eastern Europe, given the creation of preparatory national 
resistance to external actors’ movements.181 Preparing formal security forces for 
incursions or informal networks of resistance, whether violent or subversive, could prove 
effective both in solidifying the American supported liberal international order, and in 
preventing future aggressive Russian activity in Crimea and Ukraine. 
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79 
The special operations community is the one most likely to execute irregular 
warfare during GPC, and its leaders are debating how best to remain relevant in this era. 
Designing irregular warfare in the manner described here will constitute a better way to 
use this capability. In order to remain a part of the larger plan, some SOF leaders have 
conceded that a Special Forces Detachments primary responsibility is to “observe and 
report.” Others have argued that SOF will be most useful conducting strategic 
reconnaissance and, at the appropriate moment attacking hard targets to support greater 
conventional operations.182 However, this perspective is short-sighted, and captures only 
a momentary snapshot of SOF in large-scale combat operations.  
Instead, by viewing SOF’s role in GPC along the irregular warfare continuum 
described above, those forces can shape competition and prepare these options for war. 
During the competition phase, irregular warfare seeks to maintain the status quo and avoid 
war by preserving American dominance. However, in recognition of the potential for war, 
irregular warfare allows for the preparation of irregular options, which have always been 
desired in war, to achieve victory should that war come. This irregular strategy for GPC 
will still fit with other parallel governmental and military efforts and, taken holistically, 
will give the United States a distinct edge in maintaining the advantage during GPC and 
related conflicts.  
Recommendations: 
(1) Small, Agile, and Purpose-Built Elements 
The elements selected to perform irregular warfare missions should remain as small 
as possible, while still maintaining mission management. Contrary to some of the 
successful operations in the aforementioned case studies, special operations now have hefty 
headquarters elements that contribute to inefficiency by holding significant capabilities at 
higher echelons. Going forward, the United States should avoid cumbersome headquarters 
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over single missions, and instead rely on regional task forces to oversee multiple missions. 
This allows small, individual missions within individual countries to be purpose-built. 
Instead of selecting elements from a single unit, or even a single department, the U.S. 
military should adopt the practice of forming teams based on the needs of specific missions. 
While difficult, because American irregular units are organized according to line and block 
charts, all missions are unique and, especially during competition with great powers, 
require teams that are tailored to succeed.  
While simply selecting a company of special operations personnel to tackle a 
problem is tempting, it would be more appropriate and more beneficial to allow one small 
team to create its own miniature task force, drawing on capabilities that will prove critical 
in the future. With the reemergence of information warfare, political warfare, unrestricted 
warfare, and hybrid warfare, American irregular warfare must expand to include a wider 
array of these capabilities and be able to leverage them more quickly and efficiently. This 
occurs by keeping elements small, with no excessive headquarters element, and 
encouraging them to form cohesive conglomerations of capabilities. Though this will differ 
according to each mission’s needs, this may include capabilities like cyber, psychological 
operations, civil affairs, legal advisors, and economic and political advisors, to name only 
a few.  
However, the United States military already builds large task force headquarters 
according to the needs of the mission. These headquarters do not allow the tactical and 
operational units the flexibility and agility to employ them appropriately. Instead, they 
labor at larger headquarters and are frequently held up by systems and processes that must 
filter all the way down the chain of command. In the small, agile, purpose-built model 
proposed here, those capabilities are pushed down where they can be utilized more quickly 
and where they will be encouraged to be an important part of the unit of action. Oversight 
is still necessary and will still be present, albeit at a more strategic level with less 
organizational infrastructure in the middle.  
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(2) Think in Terms of Campaigns, Not Missions 
Given that the United States is still at the outset of developing its GPC strategy, it 
will be important for leaders and policy-makers at all levels to think in terms of campaigns 
rather than individual missions. As evidenced in the case studies on World War II, 
Volckmann in the Philippines and the Jedburgh Teams in France, preparation for the use 
of irregular elements in war is critical for their prospects for success. Because there was no 
network prepared to resist in the Philippines, Volckmann spent years developing a guerrilla 
force before truly making an impact at the tactical and operational level against the 
Japanese in North Luzon. Additionally, the determining factor in the success of the 
Jedburghs, who were capable operators, rested on the organization of the resistance 
elements that they encountered on the eve of the Normandy invasion. Instead of repeating 
these short-sighted mistakes, the United States should consider the trajectory and longevity 
of its operations as it develops its irregular warfare strategy. It should begin by developing 
resilience and resistance in its partners, but these preparations should always be focused on 
the potential utility of those forces in the event of an external invasion or in the event of 
war between great powers. In the grand scheme of defense spending, investment in a select 
and appropriate number of these programs can shape the entire campaign of competition 
and impact future conflict as well. 
(3) Identify Appropriate Locations for Each Type of Irregular warfare 
Moving forward, policy-makers, researchers, and military planners should leverage 
regional and irregular warfare expertise to determine locations where irregular warfare is 
viable and would support American strategic goals. As countries or regions are located and 
deemed appropriate for irregular warfare, a broad intent can be developed by policy-
makers, who would determine what the United States would gain through irregular warfare 
in a particular location. Once that intent is determined, the remainder of the planning can 
be done at lower, operational and tactical levels, in keeping with the previously described 
recommendation to keep units of action small in number but diverse in capability. Of 
course, the plan would then need to be approved at the strategic level, where limitations 
and constraints can be imposed if needed. This determination of strategic intent at higher 
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levels and planning and execution at tactical and operational levels will help keep 
operations connected to national policy and goals while remaining decentralized and agile 
in execution.  
(4) Capability Focused, Not Unit Focused 
Frequently, as operations are considered, the question of “Who is going to take the 
lead?” inevitably arises. However, based on this research, this appears to be the wrong 
question. Instead, as evidenced from successful irregular warfare case studies, the question 
should instead be: Which capabilities are required to best accomplish the stated intent? 
Commanders and other leaders should be chosen for their ability to identify the intent and 
create a cohesive team where each of those capabilities is leveraged appropriately. Too 
often, commanders are chosen because they command a certain or special unit, rather than 
for their ability to create an effective unit out of personnel from different communities. In 
many cases, the result has been an organizational structure heavily focused on one 
capability, rather than on the purposeful application of all capabilities to accomplish the 
goal. Instead, Special Operations Command should create purpose-built task forces that 
have been tailored for the operational environment and the intent of the mission. Creating 
teams built from capability rather than from organizational structure will make them more 
effective and efficient in the accomplishment of the mission. It will also connect them to 
the full gamut of national assets, while still allowing decentralized execution in each theater 
of operations.  
(5) Embrace Competition 
While the United States typically hesitates in the execution of irregular conflict, a 
strategy with irregular warfare as a critical component to effectively check great power 
expansionist efforts and shape the latest iteration of GPC. If the United States fails to 
demonstrate the same commitment to competing as its adversaries, it will likely have its 
global leadership and its preferred global order curtailed by the advancements made 
through the irregular strategies of its chief competitors. Instead, the proclamations made 
by the NSS and NDS should drive the American military to include irregular strategies in 
pursuit of competitive advantages.  
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